Intergenerational Educational Mobility and Preferences for Redistribution in Europe*

ORHAN TORUL† *Boğaziçi University*

OĞUZ ÖZTUNALI‡ *Istanbul Bilgi University*

Abstract

We examine the relationship between intergenerational educational mobility and individual preferences for redistribution. We offer a parsimonious economic model predicting that conditional on own education, those with more highly educated parents and facing higher intergenerational persistence will prefer less redistribution. We test these predictions empirically using country-cohort-gender-specific estimates of intergenerational educational mobility and individual-level survey data from 41 European countries. Our estimation results confirm the theoretical predictions, demonstrating that higher parental education and more promising mobility prospects are significantly associated with lower preferences for income redistribution. These findings highlight the critical need for policies that enhance educational accessibility and affordability to improve intergenerational mobility prospects, which could strengthen redistributive preferences and promote greater equality.

Keywords: Redistributive Preferences; Social Mobility; Economic Inequality; Equality of Opportunity

JEL Classification: *I20; I24; J62*

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†Corresponding author. Address: Boğaziçi University, Department of Economics, 34342 Bebek, Istanbul, Turkey. E-Mail: orhan.torul@boun.edu.tr

‡Address: Istanbul Bilgi University, Department of Economics, 34060 Eyüp, Istanbul, Turkey. E-Mail: oguz.oztunali@bilgi.edu.tr

1 Introduction

Redistributive preferences —individuals' subjective evaluations of the government's responsibility to reduce income inequality— have major implications for economic disparities and public policies in modern societies (Choi, 2019; Reindl and Tyran, 2021; Hedegaard et al., 2021). The existing literature examining individual-level determinants of redistributive preferences has demonstrated that socioeconomic and demographic characteristics such as age, gender, income, and education are important determinants of these attitudes (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). However, the influence of intergenerational mobility on shaping redistributive preferences has been relatively understudied in cross-country empirical research.

This paper aims to address this gap by developing a parsimonious economic model and testing the relationship between intergenerational educational mobility and redistributive preferences using survey data and comparable cross-country estimates of mobility. The model considers altruistic parents who care about their descendants' well-being and make intertemporal consumption choices under uncertainty regarding their descendants' future income. The model predicts that controlling for education, those with more highly educated parents will prefer less redistribution due to expectations of greater inherited wealth. Further, higher intergenerational educational persistence among one's birth cohort is expected to decrease average support for redistribution.

We test these predictions by linking respondents in the European Values Study (*EVS*) from 41 European countries to country-cohort-gender-specific intergenerational educational mobility estimates from the World Bank's Global Database on Intergenerational Mobility (*GDIM*). Our econometric analysis shows that, as predicted by the model, higher parental education and mobility prospects are significantly associated with lower preferences for income redistribution.

This study provides the first cross-country evidence of a negative association between intergenerational mobility and redistributive preferences. It highlights novel asymmetries in how mobility correlates with attitudes across different socioeconomic backgrounds. The parsimonious model elucidates why people with different mobility experiences can have different redistributive preferences. Our findings underscore the critical importance of promoting accessible education to foster mobility and egalitarian values.

Our results have important implications in the era of rising inequality concerns. Lower intergenerational mobility can perpetuate economic inequality by reducing support for redistribution across generations. Consequently, policies aimed at enhancing mobility prospects could strengthen redistributive

preferences and foster greater equality. We aspire to see our novel findings contribute to paving the way for more effective policy design.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 presents our economic model. Section 4 describes the data and empirical strategy. Section 5 reports the results. Section 6 concludes.

2 Related Literature

This paper relates to the extensive interdisciplinary literature on determinants of redistributive preferences and the role of intergenerational mobility experiences.[1]

The theoretical literature has long examined the substantial differences in redistributive policies between the United States and Western European countries, despite their comparable economic advancement and inclusive political institutions. Seminal contributions include Alesina and Angeletos (2005), who attribute the transatlantic differences to multiple politico-economic equilibria arising from contrasting preferences regarding inequality and redistribution.[2] The influential theoretical model by Bénabou and Ök (2001) formally elucidates how prospects for upward mobility can sustain divergent redistributive equilibria. Our parsimonious theoretical model builds on these foundational insights by deriving testable individual-level predictions about redistributive preferences based on experienced intergenerational mobility in a standard economic framework.

The empirical literature across disciplines has extensively investigated various factors predicting redistributive preferences using survey data. Canonical economic studies include Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), who highlight the salient role of income prospects, and Alesina and Giuliano (2011), who uncover significant effects of demographics like gender and race.[3] Subsequent influential research demonstrates additional salient drivers of redistributive preferences such as risk attitudes (Cojocaru, 2014b) and socially-oriented preferences (Kerschbamer and Müller, 2020). Recent advances also uncover marked ideological differences in redistributive preferences (Laméris et al., 2020).

[1] See Mengel and Weidenholzer (2022) and Mogstad and Torsvik (2023) for recent discussions on these two literatures.

[2] Among others, see also Bénabou and Tirole (2006), Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Piketty (1995), Bénabou (2000), Saint-Paul (2001), Hassler et al. (2003). For a recent re-investigation, see Torul (2020).

[3] Alesina and Giuliano (2011) show that upward educational mobility correlates positively with pro-redistributive preferences. However, their mobility definition is confined to the intergenerational difference in years of schooling regardless of the awarded degree, and their empirical scrutiny involves only American subjects.

Several other empirical studies merit mention. Corneo and Grüner (2002) demonstrate that pecuniary self-interest is not the only major factor influencing redistributive preferences; social status and ideological values also matter. Bavetta et al. (2019) find that self-positioning in society, social mobility, parents' wealth, and education are major determinants of perceived inequality. However, the authors do not examine how differences in perceived inequality lead to differences in redistributive preferences. Recently, Alesina et al. (2018) investigate how people's expectations about the likelihood of moving up or down the socioeconomic ladder affect redistributive preferences in several countries, concluding Americans are more optimistic about upward mobility than Europeans, as in Alesina and Glaeser (2004).[4] Gimpelson and Treisman (2017) also study inequality misperceptions, finding perceived rather than actual inequality strongly correlates with redistribution demand.[5,6]

In addition to actual mobility, *perceptions* of inequality and mobility also influence redistributive preferences, often deviating from reality. For instance, liberals tend to underestimate mobility more than conservatives (Chambers et al., 2015), and such misperceptions predict redistribution demand across countries (Alesina et al., 2018). Correcting inaccurate U.S. mobility beliefs can paradoxically reduce redistribution support, unlike in Western Europe (Hoy and Mager, 2021). Lower-income individuals also overestimate their societal position, while higher-income people underestimate others' incomes (Hvidberg et al., 2023). People view inequalities within their reference groups as more unfair than overall inequality, yet underestimate inequality within their groups most (Hvidberg et al., 2023). Despite sometimes misaligning with reality, individuals' perceptions adapt to life events and influence policy preferences (Stantcheva, 2021). While perceptions are significantly associated with attitudes, our study relies on objective cohort-specific mobility estimates to examine the link between experienced mobility and redistributive preferences. Reconciling subjective perceptions and objective realities to understand their relative influences

[4] Alesina et al. (2018) further show that pessimistic information about mobility raises support for redistribution, which varies over political views.

[5] Additional experimental evidence elucidates the role of fairness perceptions, control, and mobility in shaping redistributive preferences. Using survey data from transition economies, Cojocaru (2014a) finds inequality aversion tied to fairness norms. Gürdal et al. (2020)'s lab experiment shows fairness evaluation of income inequality depends on enforcing rules and norms. Krawczyk (2010) suggests individuals demand more redistribution when they have limited control over outcomes. Finally, Martorano and Günther (2023)'s recent experiment indicates different inequality types have distinct effects on redistributive preferences, e.g., limited social mobility (*high wealth inequality*) increases support for redistributive policies like higher fiscal spending for the disadvantaged (*tax rates for the wealthy*).

[6] Given the interdisciplinary nature of this research area, scholars across fields have empirically studied determinants of redistributive preferences. For example, Sznycer et al. (2017) demonstrate endorsement of redistribution is predicted by dispositional compassion, envy, and expected personal benefit, but not inherent fairness preferences. Shariff et al. (2016) show individual mobility perceptions significantly influence inequality tolerance. For an in-depth discussion of intergenerational educational mobility, see Torul and Öztunalı (2017).

remains an important agenda.

Our study makes several important contributions to the literature on educational mobility and redistributive preferences. First, we provide a pioneering multi-country empirical analysis, generating broader insights compared to single-country studies. Second, we uncover novel asymmetries in how mobility is associated with attitudes based on parental socioeconomic status. Third, we offer and test an economic model consistent with real-world patterns. Fourth, we highlight how lower mobility can perpetuate inequality by reducing redistributive support across generations.

Overall, analyzing redistributive policies through the lens of intergenerational mobility rather than just contemporary factors is critical for crafting effective and equitable policy amid rising inequality concerns. Our multi-faceted empirical analysis and theoretical model provide valuable new insights into the mobility-preference nexus.

3 A Parsimonious Model

To motivate our theoretical predictions, we propose a simple economic framework. Consider a two-period model environment where each generation lives only for one period. Assume that each parent has one child so that the population remains constant (normalized to one) over time. The population is divided into two groups based on their level of education: half of the population has a *H*igh level of educational attainment (denoted by e_H), while the other half has a *L*ow level of educational attainment (denoted by e_L) with $e_H > e_L > 0$.

Suppose that education transmission from one generation to the next follows a symmetric Markovian stochastic process $\Gamma(e_{t+1}|e_t)$ as follows:

$$\Gamma(e_{t+1}|e_t) = \begin{array}{c} \\ e_L \\ e_H \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{cc} e_L & e_H \end{array} \\ \begin{bmatrix} p & 1-p \\ 1-p & p \end{bmatrix} \end{array} \tag{1}$$

where $\Gamma(e_{t+1}|e_t)$ implies a conditional intergenerational educational persistence probability of $p \in [0,1]$ and an intergenerational educational correlation coefficient of $2p-1$.

Assume, for the sake of simplicity, that income is a (linear) product of education and constant inelastic labor supply $\bar{l}$, i.e., $y = e\bar{l}$ so that $y_L = e_L\bar{l}$ and $y_H = e_H\bar{l}$. Suppose further that both high and low-educated

individuals start the world with zero assets, i.e., $a_0^L = a_0^H = 0$, where the superscript denotes the dynastic education history, and the subscript denotes the timing of the asset-choice decision.

Assume, for the sake of further simplicity, that there is no government in the first period. As such, there is no taxation, redistribution, or public good provision. Assume further that agents in the first period expect the second period to be a *laissez-faire* economy as well. Both high- and low-educated parents are equally altruistic and care about the well-being of their children. Therefore, the expected two-generation dynastic utility of parents with education e_1 takes the following form:

$$V(e_1) = u(c_1) + \beta \mathbb{E}_1 [u(c_2)] \tag{2}$$

where

$$\mathbb{E}_1 [u(c_2)] = \begin{cases} p\ u\left(c_2^{LL}\right) + (1-p)\ u\left(c_2^{LH}\right) & \text{if } e_1 = e_L \\ p\ u\left(c_2^{HH}\right) + (1-p)\ u\left(c_2^{HL}\right) & \text{if } e_1 = e_H \end{cases} \tag{3}$$

The first-period budget constraint requires:

$$c_1^i + a_1 = a_0^i R + y^i \tag{4}$$

where $i \in \{L, H\}$, and R denotes the gross interest rate.

The second-period budget constraint of low-educated parents ($e_1 = e_L$) requires:

$$\begin{aligned} c_2^{LL} &= a_1^L R + y_L \quad \text{if } e_2 = e_L \\ c_2^{LH} &= a_1^L R + y_H \quad \text{if } e_2 = e_H \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

Similarly, the second-period budget constraint of high-educated parents ($e_1 = e_H$) requires:

$$\begin{aligned} c_2^{HL} &= a_1^H R + y_L \quad \text{if } e_2 = e_L \\ c_2^{HH} &= a_1^H R + y_H \quad \text{if } e_2 = e_H \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

Without loss of generality, assume that $\beta = R = 1$. Then, the Euler equation suggests:

$$u'(c_1) = \mathbb{E}_1 \left[u'(c_2)\right] \tag{7}$$

For the case of low-educated parents, optimal intertemporal allocation implies:

$$u'\left(c_1^L\right) = \mathbb{E}_1\left[u'\left(c_2^L\right)\right] = p\ u'\left(c_2^{LL}\right) + (1-p)\ u'\left(c_2^{LH}\right) \tag{8}$$

For the case of high-educated parents, optimality similarly implies:

$$u'\left(c_1^H\right) = \mathbb{E}_1\left[u'\left(c_2^H\right)\right] = p\ u'\left(c_2^{HH}\right) + (1-p)\ u'\left(c_2^{HL}\right) \tag{9}$$

Assuming logarithmic utility $u(c) = \log(c)$ for the sake of a closed-form solution, the optimal asset allocations implied by the Euler equation (after ruling out negative consumption values) require:[7,8]

$$a_1^L(e_L) = \frac{p\,y_L - p\,y_H - y_L - y_H}{4} + \frac{\sqrt{[p(y_H - y_L)]^2 + (y_H - 3y_L)^2 + p(-10y_L^2 + 8y_H y_L + 2y_H^2)}}{4} \tag{10}$$

$$a_1^H(e_H) = \frac{p\,y_H - p\,y_L - y_L - y_H}{4} + \frac{\sqrt{[p(y_H - y_L)]^2 + (3y_H - y_L)^2 + p(-10y_H^2 + 8y_H y_L + 2y_L^2)}}{4} \tag{11}$$

Suppose that contrary to expectations, the second period features a *government*, which collects taxes to finance redistribution and the provision of a public good. Specifically, the government taxes labor income y_2 and asset holdings inherited from the previous generation a_2 at the same linear rate τ. Then it uses α fraction of the collected tax revenue for redistribution (to equalize incomes) and the remaining $1-\alpha$ fraction for the provision of a public good, over which all agents have identical preferences defined by $v(g)$.[9] After the government's introduction, the preferences of second-generation members of dynasties

[7] It is possible to verify that the asset choices satisfy $a_1^L(e_L) < 0 < a_1^H(e_H)$ due to the strict concavity of the logarithmic utility function. This inequality is clearer for the case of a quadratic utility function: $u(c) = c - \frac{b}{2}c^2$, which implies $a_1^L(e_L) = \frac{(1-p)(y_L - y_H)}{2} < 0 < a_1^H(e_H) = \frac{(1-p)(y_H - y_L)}{2}$. The symmetry of the closed-form solutions under quadratic utility is due to the lack of precautionary savings from $u'''(c) = 0$. We proceed with logarithmic utility due to its desirable implications for most-preferred tax rate calculations.

[8] A natural prediction of the model is that conditional on the same education, individuals born to better-educated parents will be better off. We empirically test this conjecture by comparing the average incomes of university graduates born to university-graduate parents to those born to parents with below-secondary school degrees. We found that in 34 out of 41 European countries, the average incomes of university graduates born to university-graduate parents were higher. The exceptions were Austria, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Macedonia, and Norway.

[9] Our assumption that the first-generation agents expect no government presence in the second period is for the sake of simplicity: we introduce the first period only to construct intergenerational history and wealth heterogeneity. Alternatively, if the first-generation agents expected a second-period tax rate $\check{\tau}$, plausibly due to rational expectations in a politico-economic equilibrium, then $a_1^L(e_L)$ and $a_1^H(e_H)$ would be distorted by $\check{\tau}$, and the absolute distance between $a_1^L(e_L)$ and $a_1^H(e_H)$ would differ, yet our qualitative conclusions would still go through.

take the form:

$$V(a_1, e_2) = u(c_2) + v(g) \tag{12}$$

where the public good also displays positive and diminishing marginal utility, i.e., $v'(g) > 0$ and $v''(g) < 0$.[10] The updated budget constraint requires:

$$c_2 = (1-\tau)(a_1 + y_2) + r \tag{13}$$

where r denotes *r*ebate (redistribution) by the government.

Given the Markov-chain transition probability matrix and constant shares of high and low-educated parents, the second period's population shares with education histories HH, HL, LH, LL is always $\{\frac{p}{2}, \frac{1-p}{2}, \frac{p}{2}, \frac{1-p}{2}\}$, respectively. Therefore, the total tax revenue generated by the government equals:

$$\mathcal{T} = \tau\left(\frac{a_1^L(e_L) + a_1^H(e_H)}{2} + \frac{y_H + y_L}{2}\right) = \tau\left(\overline{a_1} + \overline{y}\right) \tag{14}$$

Assume that the government keeps a balanced budget. Further, it allocates α fraction of the tax revenue for redistribution and the remaining $1-\alpha$ fraction for the provision of the public good. Then, rebate and public good provision levels satisfy the following equalities:

$$r = \alpha\mathcal{T} = \alpha\tau\left(\overline{a_1} + \overline{y}\right) \tag{15}$$

$$g = (1-\alpha)\mathcal{T} = (1-\alpha)\tau\left(\overline{a_1} + \overline{y}\right) \tag{16}$$

Accordingly, the most-preferred tax rate of the individual with the asset level a_1 and labor income y_2 would then satisfy:

$$\max_{\{\tau\}} = u(c) + v(g) = u\left(\underbrace{[(1-\tau)(a_1+y_2)]}_{\text{post-tax income \& wealth}} + \underbrace{\alpha\tau(\overline{a_1}+y)}_{\text{redistribution } (r)} + v\underbrace{\left([(1-\alpha)\tau(\overline{a_1}+y)]\right)}_{\text{public good } (g)}\right) \tag{17}$$

Note that this individual considers the effects of the tax rate on their post-tax income, as well as the levels of rebates and public goods provision, when deciding on their most preferred tax rate. Additionally, an

[10] We introduce a public good in order to ensure that the preferred tax rates of households with higher levels of education and resources do not hit the corner solution zero. This allows us to establish a ranking based on interior solutions.

individual's most preferred tax rate can serve as an indicator of their preferences for redistribution, because the level of redistribution increases monotonically with the tax rate. In other words, the most preferred tax rate can be used as a proxy for an individual's support for redistribution.

The interior solution to the above problem yields:[11],[12]

$$\frac{v'(g)}{u'(c)} = \frac{a_1 + y_2}{(1-\alpha)\left(\overline{a_1} + \overline{y}\right)} - \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \tag{18}$$

Lemma 1 *Conditional on the same level of parental education, highly educated individuals prefer lower tax rates than their less educated counterparts.*

Proof of Lemma 1. See Appendix.

Lemma 2 *Conditional on the same level of education, individuals born to high-educated parents prefer lower tax rates than those born to low-educated parents.*

Proof of Lemma 2. See Appendix.

Lemma 3 *A higher intergenerational educational persistence rate reduces the average most preferred tax rate in the economy.*

Proof of Lemma 3. See Appendix.[13]

Next, we empirically test the validity of these theoretical predictions.

4 Data and Methodology

4.1 Data Description

The primary data set we use is the European Values Survey's (*EVS*) 2008 wave. Due to data limitations, we restrict our working sample to 41 countries and 32,425 respondents.[14] The *EVS*'s 2008 wave participants

[11] In order to ensure that even the high-endowed and high-educated individuals desire some positive taxation, the limiting condition $\lim_{g\to 0} v'(g) = \infty$ would suffice.

[12] Note that both the numerator $v'(g)$ and the denominator $u'(c)$ of the most-preferred tax equation are positive. Thus, for all households to have interior solution (over most-preferred taxes $\tau \in [0,1]$), we assume that $\frac{a_1+y_2}{(1-\alpha)(\overline{a_1}+\overline{y})} > \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}$ and $\frac{a_1+y_2}{(1-\alpha)(\overline{a_1}+\overline{y})} < 1 + \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}$ for all possible values of a_1, and y_2.

[13] We provide a numerical simulation exercise in Appendix to illustrate the relevant channels that contribute to these results.

[14] We use the *EVS* wave in 2008 because this wave contains detailed information about both preferences for redistribution *and* intergenerational education histories. For a list of countries in *EVS*'s 2008 wave, see Table A.1 in Appendix. Our sample consists of individuals who were at least 26 years old at the time of the survey, and thus can be regarded as having completed their education according to the standard *OECD* education definition.

were asked questions about their demographics, education, income, moral, political, societal, work, and family values. In this paper, we focus on the question with the code `v198`, which asks respondents to declare their views on a 1-10 Likert scale ranging from "*Incomes should be made more equal*" (1) to "*There should be greater incentives for individual effort*" (10). We use subjects' responses to this question as a proxy for their redistributive preferences.[15]

The *EVS* 2008 dataset also includes background information on parental education. Among the various parental education variables available in the *EVS*, we specifically use the variable `v355_r`. This variable represents the father's education if the respondent lived with both parents or only with their father at age 14. If the respondent lived only with their mother at age 14, then the variable represents the mother's education.[16]

To ensure adequately sized groups across all countries in our sample, we recode parental education into 3 categories: Lower, Middle, and Upper. These are based on the `International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED)` as follows:

- Lower (1) - `ISCED` levels `0,1,2` (lower secondary education or below)
- Middle (2) - `ISCED` levels `3,4` (secondary and post-secondary education)
- Upper (3) - `ISCED` levels `5,6` levels (tertiary education or above)

Using this 3-category classification, we define the intergenerational educational movement experienced by each respondent as a combination of their own and their parent's education level. For instance, $E = 3|P = 2$ refers to a university graduate ($E = 3$) whose parent is a high school graduate ($P = 2$). This allows us to analyze educational mobility in terms of 3 healthy-sized groupings across all countries in our sample.[17]

In our analysis, we use the World Bank's Global Database on Intergenerational Mobility (*GDIM*) variables as a proxy for the upward mobility prospects faced by subjects during their upbringing. We rely on three intergenerational educational mobility estimates from *GDIM*:

[15] Earlier literature relies either directly on `v198` or questions with similar wording for measuring respondents' redistributive preferences. See Alesina and Giuliano (2011) for the use of different wordings in measuring redistributive preferences, and Kerr (2014) and Winthrop et al. (2016) for the use of a question with almost identical wording (from *WVS*) to infer preferences for inequality.

[16] Some studies in the literature use the education level of the better-educated parent when analyzing intergenerational mobility (Neidhöfer et al., 2018). Our results remain qualitatively similar if we define parental education based on the better-educated parent rather than father's education specifically.

[17] For robustness purposes, we also redo our estimations using a 2-category classification. As shown in Table A.2, our results are robust to the choice of this more coarse categorization.

1. Intergenerational persistence in education (`IGP`): The estimated correlation coefficient between parents' and children's years of schooling regressions. This measures *relative* intergenerational mobility.
2. Absolute upward mobility probability (`MAcatM`): The likelihood that children will obtain a higher level of education than their parents or that children and the better-educated parent will both hold tertiary degrees. This measures *absolute* upward mobility, as its name suggests.
3. Conditional absolute upward mobility probability (`MAcatC1`): The likelihood that children will surpass their better-educated parent's level of education, conditional on the parent not holding a tertiary degree. This also measures *absolute* upward mobility.[18]

All three *GDIM* estimates demonstrate the empirical difficulty of intergenerational mobility for subjects' birth cohorts, stratified by country and gender.[19] We match subjects in the *EVS* dataset to the relevant *GDIM* intergenerational mobility variables based on their country, gender, and birth decade.

4.2 Methodology

Our econometric models use ordinary least squares (*OLS*) regression to examine the relationship between *preferences for redistribution* (the dependent variable: `v198`) while controlling for other relevant factors. The control variables include country-fixed effects, demographic controls (age and gender), household income, dummies for intergenerational educational movement, and country-cohort-gender-specific estimates of intergenerational educational mobility. Our benchmark regression model is as follows:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Demographics}_i + \beta_2 \text{Country}_i + \beta_3 \log(\text{Income}_i) + \sum \beta_4^{m,n} \text{Education}_i^{m,n} + \beta_5 \text{GDIM}_i^{c,t,g} + u_i \quad (19)$$

In Equation (19), Demographics_i denotes the vector of demographic controls for individual i, Country_i denotes the country-fixed dummy to control for time-invariant nation-specific factors, $\log(\text{Income}_i)$ de-

[18] To calculate the absolute mobility measures `MAcatM` and `MAcatC1`, *GDIM* categorizes education levels into 5 groups using the `ISCED` definitions: 1-Less than primary school graduate (`ISCED 0`), 2-Primary school graduate (`ISCED 1`), 3- Lower secondary school graduate (`ISCED 2`), 4- Upper secondary or post-secondary (non-tertiary) school graduate (`ISCED 3-4`), and 5-Tertiary school graduate (`ISCED 5-6`). The literature on intergenerational mobility interprets *IGP* as an inverse proxy for upward mobility prospects. This is because a coefficient of 1 implies that, on average, children's years of schooling mimic their parents' perfectly. A coefficient of 0 suggests no correlation between parents' and children's education - meaning each child has an equal chance at education regardless of their parents' background. See Corak (2013) for further discussion on intergenerational income mobility prospects.

[19] The *GDIM* contains a few other intergenerational mobility estimates, such as `BHQ4`: the probability of a child from the bottom half ending up in the top quartile, and `Asher_Q4_IGpri`: intergenerational privilege - the probability of a child born into the top parental quartile remaining there. We exclude these variables from our analysis because they do not necessarily represent *de facto* mobility prospects for all subjects in our sample.

notes the natural logarithm of PPP-adjusted household income (in euros), $\text{Education}_i^{m,n}$ denotes the vector of education dummies that take the value 1 for subject i whose education level is $n \in \{1,2,3\}$ and parent's education is $m \in \{1,2,3\}$, and 0 otherwise.[20] $\text{GDIM}_i^{c,t,g}$ denotes one of the country-cohort-gender specific intergenerational educational mobility prospect estimates from *GDIM*. Finally, u_i denotes the error term.[21,22]

In summary, the model controls for demographic factors, national differences, income, and detailed measures of experienced and expected mobility in order to isolate the relationship between mobility and redistributive preferences. The key estimates of interest are the coefficients on the 1) intergenerational educational mobility variables (β_5), which represent the relationship between mobility prospects and preferences for redistribution, and 2) dummies for intergenerational educational movements (β_4), which demonstrate how experienced intergenerational mobility is associated with redistributive preferences. Note that the dependent variable, `v198`, is lower when individuals support redistribution. Therefore, a smaller coefficient is associated with a stronger preference for redistribution.

5 Empirical Results

We report our main findings in Table 1. The five models presented vary in terms of the demographic controls and the *GDIM*-based intergenerational mobility estimates included.[23] Our estimates show that, after controlling for other factors, lower educational attainment is associated with greater support for redistribution. Additionally, parental education is negatively correlated with support for redistribution. In other words, controlling for education, individuals born to less-educated parents have stronger support for redistribution.

[20] This dummy formulation demonstrates each individual's mobility experience: upward mobility ($n > m$), persistence ($n = m$), or downward mobility ($n < m$) between specific parental and descendant education levels.

[21] In our benchmark estimations, we include age and gender as demographic control variables. We tested additional demographic factors like marital status and number of descendants. However, we omit these from the final models because they are not significantly correlated with the dependent variable.

[22] We cluster the standard errors at the country level. This accounts for possible heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-country correlation, providing more robust standard error estimates.

[23] Our estimation results indicate that the coefficient before age is insignificant (with a coefficient value lower than 0.002 in absolute magnitude) in all our specifications. The coefficient before gender (male dummy) is significant at $p = 0.01$ with a coefficient of 0.168 if one of the *GDIM* variables is controlled for and 0.157 if not. The fact that females exhibit higher redistributive preferences accords with the earlier work in the literature (Jaime-Castillo et al., 2016; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Fong, 2001). We keep both variables as demographic controls to avoid omitted variable bias despite their different significance levels.

Table 1: Regression Results for the 9-Category Representation of Mobility

Preference for Redistribution (v198)					
Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
$E = 2 \mid P = 1$	0.154**	0.143**	0.154**	0.164***	0.165***
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.061)
$E = 3 \mid P = 1$	0.430***	0.427***	0.438***	0.452***	0.455***
	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.094)
$E = 2 \mid P = 2$	0.252***	0.244***	0.251***	0.252***	0.252***
	(0.076)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.079)
$E = 3 \mid P = 2$	0.472***	0.472***	0.478***	0.485***	0.487***
	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)
$E = 2 \mid P = 3$	0.339**	0.330**	0.337**	0.337**	0.337**
	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.133)
$E = 3 \mid P = 3$	0.572***	0.572***	0.578***	0.585***	0.587***
	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.109)
log(Income)	0.180***	0.176***	0.174***	0.173***	0.173***
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Intergenerational Persistence (IGP)			0.338**		
			(0.166)		
Cond. Abs. Upward Mobility (MAcatC1)				-0.573**	
				(0.219)	
Abs. Upward Mobility (MAcatM)					-0.696***
					(0.236)
Constant	4.806***	4.714***	4.566***	5.006***	5.112***
	(0.070)	(0.096)	(0.113)	(0.158)	(0.174)
Observations	32,425	32,425	32,425	32,425	32,425
R-squared	0.151	0.152	0.152	0.152	0.152
Demographic Controls	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by asterisks (*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is *preferences for redistribution* (v198), measured on a 10-point scale where lower values indicate greater support for redistribution. The rows list the independent variables. The coefficient for $E = X|P = Y$ represents the dummy variable for respondents whose own educational attainment is X and whose father's educational attainment is Y, where 1 denotes lower education, 2 denotes middle education, and 3 denotes upper education. log(Income) is the natural logarithm of PPP-adjusted household income in euros. IGP, MAcatM, and MAcatC1 are *GDIM*-based measures of intergenerational persistence, absolute upward mobility, and conditional absolute upward mobility, respectively. All variables except the *GDIM*-based measures are from the *EVS* 2008 wave. See the Data Description subsection for details.

Our findings are consistent with the extant literature, which has demonstrated that lower levels of education are associated with more egalitarian preferences (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). However, our study is novel in its finding that parental education and redistributive preferences exhibit a significant correlation even after controlling for other relevant covariates. This suggests that parental education may have a lasting association with redistributive preferences.[24] Our findings are robust to the inclusion of additional

[24] Pairwise t-tests with robust standard errors confirm that higher educational attainment, conditional on parental education, correlates negatively and significantly with preferences for redistribution ($p = 0.01$). Additionally, conditional on educational attainment, higher parental education significantly ($p = 0.05$) and negatively correlates with redistributive preferences in most cases. For example, under Model 2, the null hypothesis that the coefficient before $E = 2|P = 2$ and $E = 2|P = 1$ is the same is rejected with a t-statistic of 4.67 ($p = 0.031$). Similarly, the null hypothesis that the coefficient before $E = 3|P = 1$ and $E = 3|P = 3$ is the same is rejected with a t-statistic of 4.35 ($p = 0.037$). We acknowledge that the coefficient before $E = 3|P = 2$ (i.e., 0.472) is not significantly different from $E = 3|P = 3$ (i.e., 0.572), despite the sizable magnitude difference.

control variables and alternative model specifications.[25]

Our theoretical model provides a plausible explanation for this result through the negative effect of wealth accumulation on redistribution support. Specifically, those with higher parental education may anticipate greater inheritance prospects, which could reduce their preferences for redistribution.[26] Further research on the causal identification of this mechanism is warranted.

Our findings reveal a notable asymmetry in the relationship between redistributive preferences and educational attainment in Europe. Specifically, the marginal negative change in redistributive preferences associated with university graduation is considerably higher than that of high school graduation. This contrasts with Alesina and Giuliano (2011), who reported relatively similar marginal estimates for the two levels of education.[27]

Our findings also reveal significant asymmetries in the correlation between intergenerational educational mobility and redistributive preferences. For example, among individuals with a high school diploma, those whose parents have a university degree have a preference for redistribution that is 0.08 units higher than those whose parents hold only a high school diploma. However, among individuals whose parents hold a high school diploma, those who have a university degree have a preference for redistribution that is at least 0.23 units higher than those who hold only a high school diploma. We depict these asymmetries in Figure 1.[28]

These asymmetries challenge the estimation strategy of Alesina and Giuliano (2011), who symmetrically model intergenerational mobility as the difference in years of schooling between generations. Our findings highlight the importance of considering nonlinearities and complexities in the relationship between both personal and parental education and redistributive attitudes.


[25] In our estimations presented in Table 1, we have omitted the dummy variables for low-educated individuals. The dummy variable for $(E = 1|P = 1)$ was omitted to avoid perfect multicollinearity, while the dummy variables for $(E = 1|P = 2)$ and $(E = 1|P = 3)$ were omitted due to their limited empirical frequency and linear dependency. Including the dummy variables for $(E = 1 \mid P = 2)$ and $(E = 1 \mid P = 3)$ result in insignificant coefficients, as reported in Table A.4.

[26] Another possible explanation is that upwardly mobile individuals are more likely to support policies that transfer economic resources to low-educated individuals, with whom they still have ties and feel empathy for. This is consistent with Sorokin's dissociative hypothesis, which posits that upward social mobility can lead to a sense of detachment from one's lower-class roots. As a result, upwardly mobile individuals may be more likely to support policies that help those who are still struggling.

[27] Alesina and Giuliano (2011) rely on the General Social Survey (*GSS*, 1972-2004) for the US and the World Values Survey (*WVS*, Waves 1-4, 1981-2004) for cross-country estimates. The different time periods, question-wording, Likert scales, and national contexts between these surveys may explain their more similar estimated impacts of high school and college graduation compared to our *EVS* analysis, which reveals larger marginal effects for tertiary education.

[28] We also report these average effects of high school and college graduation on Table A.5.

Figure 1: Marginal effect of descendant education over parental education on preferences for redistribution



Notes: Figure 1 displays the predicted values for redistributive preferences conditional on descendants' and their parents' education. The dependent variable, *preferences for redistribution*, is measured on a 10-point scale where lower values indicate greater support for redistribution. The estimated values are calculated using Table 1. See the Data Description and Methodology subsections for additional details.

Our cross-country estimation results confirm that (PPP-adjusted log) income is negatively correlated with pro-redistributive preferences, consistent with the prior literature (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005) and economic theory. This negative correlation is highly significant and robust across alternative model specifications.

Next, we examine the role of intergenerational educational mobility prospects that subjects faced when they grew up. Models 3 to 5 add the *GDIM* mobility variables one by one as independent controls to reveal the impact of country-cohort-gender-specific intergenerational educational prospects. Model 3 shows that higher intergenerational educational persistence is associated with less support for redistribution. Similarly, Models 4 and 5 demonstrate that greater absolute and conditional upward mobility is linked to stronger preferences for redistribution. These novel findings are robust to alternative formulations and geographic contexts. The coefficients are more significant for earlier cohorts than for their younger counterparts born in the 1980s.[29,30]

[29] Despite the prevalence of misperceptions about mobility, our study relies on objective cohort-specific mobility estimates instead of perceptions. We demonstrate that actually experienced mobility is associated with redistributive preferences. Our findings are robust across 41 countries, suggesting that the role of experienced mobility generalizes beyond specific national contexts. Nevertheless, an important caveat is that perceptions may deviate from reality. Reconciling the two to isolate their effects warrants further investigation.

[30] Torul and Öztunalı (2017) show that intergenerational educational persistence and upward mobility have been negatively correlated over time in Europe for cohorts born between 1940 and 1985. This implies that an increase in intergenerational educational persistence empirically coincides with lower upward mobility. The fact that the coefficients for intergenerational educational persistence and upward mobility in our study have opposite signs is consistent with this finding. Results by time and geography are available upon request.

In summary, these findings indicate that lower intergenerational mobility prospects during childhood are associated with weaker redistributive preferences later in life. This highlights the enduring impact of mobility experiences.[31]

6 Conclusions

This study examines the relationship between intergenerational educational mobility and preferences for redistribution across 41 European countries. We develop and test a parsimonious economic model that predicts that individuals born to more educated parents and facing higher intergenerational persistence will prefer lower redistribution, conditional on their own education. Our empirical analysis confirms these predictions for our European sample.

The study makes several key contributions. First, it provides pioneering cross-country evidence linking lower mobility to weaker redistributive preferences. Second, it uncovers asymmetries in how mobility is associated with preferences depending on parental background. Third, it proposes and confirms predictions from a straightforward yet insightful theoretical framework.

These findings have important policy implications. Several European countries exhibit high educational persistence across generations.[32] This perpetuates inequality by reducing redistributive support for those from disadvantaged backgrounds, creating a vicious cycle. Our results highlight the critical need for educational policies enhancing accessibility and affordability to break this cycle. Improving mobility prospects could strengthen egalitarian attitudes and promote greater equality in an era of ever-increasing inequality concerns.

While this study focuses on Europe, future research could investigate if similar mobility-preference relationships hold in other regions. Analyzing how experienced mobility shapes attitudes globally is an important agenda. Overall, our study highlights the need to view redistributive policies through the lens of intergenerational mobility.

[31] Sznycer et al. (2017) show that redistributive preferences can be shaped by both compassion and envy motivations. Our findings corroborate this, as unfavorable mobility prospects reduce redistribution support (*envy*), while decent prospects increase it (*compassion*). They also find that expectations of personal gain matter. Our model shows that concern for dynastic well-being can explain why higher persistence decreases redistribution support. Additionally, if persistence is seen as stemming from effort, less support aligns with Krawczyk (2010), who finds that outcomes seen as effort-based reduce redistribution demand. While Krawczyk (2010) discusses equal opportunity reducing redistribution support, his experiments show that inequality of opportunity does not increase it.

[32] See Narayan et al. (2018) and Torul and Öztunalı (2017) for various intergenerational educational mobility estimates in Europe.

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Appendix

A Appendix: Figures and Tables

Table A.1: Frequencies of Respondent Education Levels by Parental Education

Country \ Education	Parent: Lower			Parent: Middle			Parent: Upper			
	Lower	Middle	Upper	Lower	Middle	Upper	Lower	Middle	Upper	Mean of v198
Albania	39.1%	31.1%	9.1%	2.0%	7.3%	6.4%	0.2%	1.3%	3.5%	3.50
Armenia	11.6%	22.6%	3.1%	1.3%	30.1%	13.2%	0.3%	5.3%	12.5%	6.85
Austria	13.8%	24.1%	2.5%	4.0%	43.3%	6.7%	0.1%	2.4%	3.1%	1.41
Belarus	7.2%	25.5%	7.5%	0.6%	28.8%	17.2%	0.0%	3.9%	9.3%	5.47
Belgium	30.1%	21.2%	11.7%	2.3%	7.7%	12.4%	0.7%	2.4%	11.4%	4.98
Bosnia Herzegovina	23.6%	30.2%	3.4%	3.4%	26.4%	7.8%	0.3%	2.7%	2.3%	3.68
Bulgaria	23.9%	33.5%	4.0%	1.3%	20.2%	10.5%	0.1%	1.6%	4.9%	9.10
Croatia	24.1%	27.6%	5.7%	1.6%	20.7%	11.0%	0.4%	4.5%	4.4%	2.51
Cyprus	36.8%	37.7%	9.1%	0.2%	7.4%	6.4%	0.0%	0.2%	2.2%	3.63
Czech Republic	7.3%	16.5%	0.3%	4.1%	58.0%	9.3%	0.0%	2.1%	2.5%	2.63
Denmark	10.7%	12.8%	9.7%	6.8%	19.5%	17.7%	2.6%	6.3%	13.9%	8.37
Estonia	39.3%	20.5%	15.0%	5.0%	4.2%	5.6%	1.1%	3.2%	6.1%	5.88
Finland	8.1%	15.9%	29.2%	1.0%	8.4%	17.6%	0.5%	3.1%	16.2%	2.78
France	20.5%	30.1%	12.5%	0.8%	10.3%	11.9%	0.8%	3.7%	9.5%	3.91
Georgia	4.0%	12.7%	2.6%	1.0%	32.2%	21.3%	0.1%	5.1%	21.0%	8.98
Germany	7.3%	12.5%	2.9%	3.9%	44.8%	12.3%	0.3%	7.1%	8.7%	2.13
Great Britain	42.4%	11.5%	18.8%	2.4%	2.3%	4.2%	1.9%	4.2%	12.2%	3.90
Greece	44.2%	25.5%	9.9%	1.7%	7.5%	5.8%	0.5%	1.5%	3.2%	2.91
Hungary	21.1%	25.3%	3.2%	2.9%	30.9%	7.9%	0.2%	2.9%	5.5%	3.82
Iceland	11.2%	15.2%	9.2%	5.8%	20.3%	19.9%	1.3%	5.6%	11.4%	3.73
Ireland	38.6%	26.3%	13.5%	1.0%	6.4%	7.4%	0.2%	2.2%	4.4%	4.55
Italy	35.3%	34.5%	9.5%	0.8%	8.9%	6.1%	0.0%	1.9%	3.1%	5.91
Kosovo	19.2%	40.4%	8.1%	0.6%	16.6%	7.6%	0.3%	2.2%	4.9%	3.69
Latvia	13.4%	32.5%	10.1%	2.2%	18.6%	12.2%	0.7%	4.0%	6.2%	7.77
Lithuania	16.2%	24.1%	19.7%	1.1%	9.7%	13.8%	0.5%	3.3%	11.5%	5.04
Macedonia	20.1%	30.8%	7.8%	0.4%	17.1%	11.7%	0.2%	4.7%	7.3%	8.37
Moldova	19.4%	39.8%	7.9%	1.8%	17.5%	9.2%	0.0%	1.4%	2.9%	4.20
Montenegro	19.8%	28.1%	6.2%	1.5%	23.3%	10.2%	0.3%	4.2%	6.4%	6.41
Netherlands	36.3%	16.7%	18.4%	1.5%	4.8%	6.5%	0.9%	3.0%	12.0%	4.05
Norway	22.5%	19.0%	21.5%	2.1%	5.8%	11.8%	1.0%	4.2%	12.2%	5.23
Poland	14.8%	55.1%	7.7%	0.5%	9.6%	5.8%	0.1%	2.1%	4.3%	4.80
Portugal	76.7%	12.7%	5.5%	0.8%	1.2%	1.1%	0.3%	0.5%	1.2%	3.95
Romania	29.2%	37.7%	4.1%	2.2%	18.9%	4.7%	0.1%	0.9%	2.0%	2.19
Russian Federation	13.3%	28.8%	8.3%	1.7%	21.9%	12.6%	0.4%	3.8%	9.1%	7.45
Serbia	24.7%	27.3%	6.9%	1.7%	19.7%	9.5%	0.1%	3.7%	6.3%	3.53
Slovak Republic	18.5%	35.1%	2.4%	1.6%	32.4%	6.7%	0.0%	1.5%	1.9%	5.65
Slovenia	41.6%	23.1%	13.1%	2.0%	7.4%	5.7%	0.3%	1.8%	5.1%	1.77
Spain	48.9%	26.2%	9.8%	0.8%	3.0%	4.0%	0.8%	1.8%	4.6%	2.93
Sweden	18.2%	28.5%	19.4%	1.0%	9.9%	9.7%	0.3%	4.0%	9.0%	2.80
Switzerland	9.4%	16.0%	3.8%	3.1%	37.1%	13.9%	0.4%	5.8%	10.5%	2.98
Turkey	75.2%	13.3%	4.9%	1.5%	1.8%	1.4%	0.4%	0.4%	1.1%	3.60
Ukraine	10.3%	23.3%	14.7%	0.7%	16.1%	13.1%	0.2%	5.7%	16.1%	9.38
All Countries	25.8%	24.7%	9.0%	2.1%	17.9%	9.6%	0.4%	3.1%	7.2%	5.07

Notes: Table A.1 displays the within-country frequencies of respondents' education levels along with their parent's education levels. The last column reports country averages by subjects for redistributive preferences measured on a 10-point scale where lower values indicate greater support for redistribution.

Table A.2: Preference for Redistribution via 2-Category Mobility

Preference for Redistribution (v198)					
Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
$E = 2 \mid P = 1$	0.308***	0.312***	0.314***	0.319***	0.321***
	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.066)
$E = 1 \mid P = 2$	0.165	0.156	0.156	0.151	0.151
	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.120)	(0.120)
$E = 2 \mid P = 2$	0.420***	0.421***	0.420***	0.423***	0.425***
	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)
log(Income)	0.199***	0.191***	0.190***	0.190***	0.189***
	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Intergenerational Persistence (IGP)			0.282		
			(0.178)		
Cond. Abs. Upward Mobility (MAcatC1)				-0.512**	
				(0.232)	
Abs. Upward Mobility (MAcatM)					-0.638**
					(0.248)
Constant	4.918***	4.879***	4.761***	5.150***	5.253***
	(0.053)	(0.074)	(0.105)	(0.146)	(0.164)
Observations	32,425	32,425	32,425	32,425	32,425
R-squared	0.150	0.151	0.151	0.151	0.152
Demographic Controls	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by asterisks (*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is *preferences for redistribution* (v198), measured on a 10-point scale where lower values indicate greater support for redistribution. The rows list the independent variables. The coefficient for $E = X|P = Y$ represents the dummy variable for respondents whose own educational attainment is X and whose father's educational attainment is Y, where 1 denotes lower and middle education, and 2 denotes upper ((tertiary)) education. log(Income) is the natural logarithm of PPP-adjusted household income in euros. IGP, MAcatM, and MAcatC1 are *GDIM*-based measures of intergenerational persistence, absolute upward mobility, and conditional absolute upward mobility, respectively. All variables except the *GDIM*-based measures are from the *EVS* 2008 wave.

Table A.3: Preference for Redistribution via 2-Category Education

Preference for Redistribution (v198)					
Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
$P = 2$	0.133*	0.127*	0.126*	0.122	0.122
	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)
$E = 2$	0.300***	0.305***	0.306***	0.311***	0.313***
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)
log(Income)	0.199***	0.191***	0.190***	0.190***	0.189***
	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Intergenerational Persistence (IGP)			0.282		
			(0.178)		
Cond. Abs. Upward Mobility (MAcatC1)				-0.512**	
				(0.232)	
Abs. Upward Mobility (MAcatM)					-0.638**
					(0.248)
Constant	4.919***	4.881***	4.763***	5.152***	5.255***
	(0.052)	(0.072)	(0.104)	(0.146)	(0.164)
Observations	32,425	32,425	32,425	32,425	32,425
R-squared	0.150	0.151	0.151	0.151	0.152
Demographic Controls	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by asterisks (*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is *preferences for redistribution* (v198), measured on a 10-point scale where lower values indicate greater support for redistribution. The rows list the independent variables. P and E denote the education levels of the parent and subject, respectively. 1 (baseline, thus omitted to avoid multicollinearity) denotes lower and middle education, and 2 denotes upper (tertiary) education. log(Income) is the natural logarithm of PPP-adjusted household income in euros. IGP, MAcatM, and MAcatC1 are *GDIM*-based measures of intergenerational persistence, absolute upward mobility, and conditional absolute upward mobility, respectively. All variables except the *GDIM*-based measures are from the *EVS* 2008 wave.

Table A.4: Regression Results with Low-Educated Descendant Controls

Preference for Redistribution (v198)					
Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
$E=2 \mid P=1$	0.181***	0.171**	0.182***	0.192***	0.193***
	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)
$E=3 \mid P=1$	0.457***	0.455***	0.466***	0.480***	0.482***
	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.101)
$E=1 \mid P=2$	0.238*	0.240	0.242*	0.238	0.238
	(0.141)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.143)
$E=2 \mid P=2$	0.282***	0.278***	0.284***	0.285***	0.284***
	(0.076)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)
$E=3 \mid P=2$	0.501***	0.504***	0.511***	0.517***	0.519***
	(0.091)	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)
$E=1 \mid P=3$	0.126	0.124	0.121	0.117	0.116
	(0.264)	(0.267)	(0.266)	(0.268)	(0.268)
$E=2 \mid P=3$	0.369**	0.363**	0.371**	0.370**	0.370**
	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.138)	(0.137)	(0.138)
$E=3 \mid P=3$	0.601***	0.605***	0.611***	0.617***	0.620***
	(0.110)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.112)
log(Income)	0.179***	0.174***	0.173***	0.172***	0.171***
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Intergenerational Persistence (IGP)			0.340**		
			(0.166)		
Cond. Abs. Upward Mobility (MAcatC1)				-0.571**	
				(0.220)	
Abs. Upward Mobility (MAcatM)					-0.694***
					(0.237)
Constant	4.783***	4.675***	4.526***	4.967***	5.073***
	(0.074)	(0.102)	(0.117)	(0.167)	(0.184)
Observations	32,425	32,425	32,425	32,425	32,425
R-squared	0.151	0.152	0.152	0.152	0.152
Demographic Controls	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by asterisks (*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is *preferences for redistribution* (v198), measured on a 10-point scale where lower values indicate greater support for redistribution. The rows list the independent variables. The coefficient for $E = X|P = Y$ represents the dummy variable for respondents whose own educational attainment is X and whose father's educational attainment is Y, where 1 denotes lower education, 2 denotes middle education, and 3 denotes upper education. log(Income) is the natural logarithm of PPP-adjusted household income in euros. IGP, MAcatM, and MAcatC1 are *GDIM*-based measures of intergenerational persistence, absolute upward mobility, and conditional absolute upward mobility, respectively. All variables except the *GDIM*-based measures are from the *EVS* 2008 wave.

Table A.5: Regression Results without Intergenerational Mobility Controls

Preference for Redistribution (v198)					
Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
$P=2$	0.098**	0.103**	0.099**	0.091**	0.090**
	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)
$P=3$	0.175**	0.179**	0.175**	0.167**	0.166**
	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.081)
$E=2$	0.170***	0.161**	0.171***	0.180***	0.181***
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.061)
$E=3$	0.414***	0.413***	0.423***	0.436***	0.439***
	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.076)
log(Income)	0.179***	0.175***	0.173***	0.172***	0.172***
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Intergenerational Persistence (IGP)			0.336*		
			(0.167)		
Cond. Abs. Upward Mobility (MAcatC1)				-0.566**	
				(0.222)	
Abs. Upward Mobility (MAcatM)					-0.689***
					(0.239)
Constant	4.794***	4.689***	4.542***	4.979***	5.084***
	(0.070)	(0.099)	(0.116)	(0.161)	(0.177)
Observations	32,425	32,425	32,425	32,425	32,425
R-squared	0.151	0.152	0.152	0.152	0.152
Demographic Controls	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by asterisks (*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is *preferences for redistribution* (v198), measured on a 10-point scale where lower values indicate greater support for redistribution. The rows list the independent variables. P and E denote the education levels of the parent and subject, respectively. 1 (baseline, thus omitted to avoid multicollinearity) denotes lower, 2 denotes middle education, and 3 denotes upper education. log(Income) is the natural logarithm of PPP-adjusted household income in euros. IGP, MAcatM, and MAcatC1 are *GDIM*-based measures of intergenerational persistence, absolute upward mobility, and conditional absolute upward mobility, respectively. All variables except the *GDIM*-based measures are from the *EVS* 2008 wave.

Table A.6: Summary Statistics

Country	% Female	Mean Age	PPP-Adjusted Monthly HH. Income (in Euros)	% Children with low Edu.	% Children with Middle Edu.	% Children with High Edu.	% Parents with Low Edu.	% Parents with Middle Edu.	% Parents with High Edu.	Mean IGP	Mean MAcatM	Mean MAcatC1
Albania	51.81%	46.35	612.43	41.33%	39.72%	18.95%	79.33%	15.63%	5.04%	0.44	0.66	0.65
Armenia	41.31%	48.81	302.65	13.21%	57.99%	28.80%	37.34%	44.59%	18.07%	0.38	0.40	0.36
Austria	44.00%	50.82	1725.95	17.89%	69.79%	12.32%	40.42%	54.00%	5.58%	0.39	0.42	0.38
Belarus	38.13%	47.67	766.65	7.84%	58.11%	34.05%	40.17%	46.62%	13.21%	0.24	0.56	0.49
Belgium	49.09%	51.34	1996.52	33.12%	31.31%	35.57%	63.07%	22.41%	14.52%	0.35	0.68	0.66
Bosnia Herzegovina	45.06%	45.75	585.80	27.25%	59.28%	13.46%	57.11%	37.57%	5.32%	0.45	0.57	0.57
Bulgaria	44.05%	52.64	591.39	25.33%	55.29%	19.38%	61.34%	32.04%	6.62%	0.52	0.59	0.56
Croatia	40.28%	50.55	1070.08	26.18%	52.78%	21.05%	57.37%	33.33%	9.29%	0.50	0.63	0.62
Cyprus	47.51%	53.17	1755.80	36.92%	45.26%	17.82%	83.63%	13.96%	2.41%	0.37	0.76	0.76
Czech Re.	44.38%	52.50	1177.43	11.33%	76.56%	12.11%	24.13%	71.28%	4.58%	0.41	0.26	0.21
Denmark	53.38%	51.22	2147.87	20.04%	38.61%	41.35%	33.12%	43.99%	22.89%	0.35	0.59	0.56
Estonia	33.56%	53.32	897.76	45.41%	27.82%	26.77%	74.76%	14.82%	10.42%	0.28	0.62	0.59
Finland	51.02%	49.28	2788.26	9.58%	27.43%	62.99%	53.29%	26.95%	19.76%	0.27	0.68	0.66
France	46.56%	51.89	1848.81	22.07%	44.05%	33.88%	63.12%	22.94%	13.94%	0.35	0.65	0.63
Georgia	36.35%	49.35	294.83	5.12%	50.00%	44.88%	19.28%	54.52%	26.20%	0.40	0.65	0.60
Germany	47.71%	52.12	1640.22	11.60%	64.42%	23.98%	22.80%	61.07%	16.12%	0.37	0.38	0.32
Great Britain	42.69%	53.26	2043.46	46.75%	18.02%	35.23%	72.73%	8.93%	18.34%	0.26	0.63	0.60
Greece	43.09%	52.96	1377.31	46.43%	34.60%	18.97%	79.69%	15.06%	5.24%	0.47	0.71	0.71
Hungary	46.42%	49.55	726.05	24.22%	59.13%	16.65%	49.65%	41.68%	8.68%	0.50	0.48	0.46
Iceland	49.46%	47.24	2183.46	18.30%	41.12%	40.58%	35.69%	46.01%	18.30%	0.34	0.57	0.54
Ireland	39.07%	49.11	1964.85	39.80%	34.89%	25.31%	78.38%	14.74%	6.88%	0.36	0.72	0.70
Italy	51.26%	50.96	1743.03	36.09%	45.27%	18.64%	79.23%	15.85%	4.93%	0.46	0.70	0.70
Kosovo	52.22%	44.85	412.08	20.19%	59.20%	20.61%	67.76%	24.84%	7.40%	0.42	0.53	0.54
Latvia	34.02%	50.97	777.72	16.25%	55.18%	28.57%	56.05%	33.04%	10.91%	0.28	0.62	0.62
Lithuania	46.07%	50.23	862.59	17.84%	37.15%	45.01%	60.05%	24.63%	15.31%	0.22	0.69	0.65
Macedonia	58.03%	47.34	1104.25	20.67%	52.53%	26.81%	58.66%	29.15%	12.18%	0.61	0.56	0.55
Moldova	44.37%	50.48	201.12	21.19%	58.83%	19.98%	67.22%	28.48%	4.30%	0.29	0.71	0.69
Montenegro	43.30%	47.64	781.60	21.60%	55.56%	22.85%	54.21%	34.89%	10.90%	0.48	0.55	0.54
Netherlands	47.04%	54.93	2298.75	38.71%	24.46%	36.83%	71.33%	12.81%	15.86%	0.35	0.70	0.71
Norway	53.28%	49.54	2505.36	25.63%	28.96%	45.41%	62.93%	19.79%	17.28%	0.36	0.64	0.60
Poland	45.36%	49.68	1254.49	15.38%	66.86%	17.76%	77.60%	15.84%	6.56%	0.39	0.63	0.61
Portugal	40.25%	54.60	1798.93	77.73%	14.44%	7.83%	94.93%	3.07%	2.00%	0.60	0.64	0.64
Romania	45.04%	51.82	667.60	31.56%	57.57%	10.87%	71.04%	25.89%	3.07%	0.56	0.67	0.66
Russian Fed.	32.93%	50.47	505.98	15.49%	54.53%	29.99%	50.38%	36.31%	13.30%	0.26	0.73	0.71
Serbia	47.41%	49.47	682.15	26.53%	50.77%	22.70%	58.91%	30.94%	10.15%	0.48	0.54	0.53
Slovak Republic	39.16%	55.88	852.98	20.10%	68.90%	10.99%	56.02%	40.63%	3.35%	0.35	0.44	0.41
Slovenia	45.80%	51.45	1711.16	43.84%	32.28%	23.87%	77.78%	15.02%	7.21%	0.42	0.52	0.50
Spain	46.12%	50.00	1811.40	50.55%	31.02%	18.42%	84.90%	7.89%	7.20%	0.44	0.75	0.74
Sweden	47.81%	50.76	2283.69	19.59%	42.40%	38.02%	66.01%	20.62%	13.36%	0.27	0.72	0.72
Switzerland	47.03%	50.93	2733.78	12.87%	58.91%	28.22%	29.21%	54.08%	16.71%	0.34	0.56	0.51
Turkey	42.78%	44.09	504.37	77.06%	15.53%	7.41%	93.41%	4.69%	1.90%	0.62	0.58	0.58
Ukraine	37.62%	51.56	483.27	11.18%	45.01%	43.81%	48.20%	29.84%	21.96%	0.27	0.76	0.70

Table A.7: GDIM Mobility Variables (`IGP`, `MAcatM` & `MAcatC1`) by Country and Decade

Decade	IGP										MAcatM										MAcatC1									
	1940		1950		1960		1970		1980		1940		1950		1960		1970		1980		1940		1950		1960		1970		1980	
Sex / Country	♂	♀	♂	♀	♂	♀	♂	♀	♂	♀	♂	♀	♂	♀	♂	♀	♂	♀	♂	♀	♂	♀	♂	♀	♂	♀	♂	♀	♂	♀
Albania	0.64	0.52	0.33	0.54	0.38	0.40	0.42	0.44	0.38	0.40	0.61	0.57	0.73	0.72	0.69	0.64	0.64	0.62	0.65	0.71	0.61	0.58	0.72	0.71	0.67	0.64	0.64	0.63	0.65	0.69
Armenia	0.29	0.46	0.28	0.32	0.50	0.29	0.36	0.37	0.52	0.45	0.56	0.53	0.48	0.48	0.36	0.32	0.27	0.24	0.42	0.35	0.57	0.51	0.49	0.51	0.30	0.32	0.26	0.19	0.29	0.24
Austria	0.41	0.33	0.43	0.39	0.44	0.42	0.24	0.31	0.52	0.38	0.49	0.26	0.48	0.37	0.49	0.39	0.41	0.39	0.48	0.51	0.43	0.25	0.44	0.34	0.45	0.36	0.38	0.34	0.42	0.39
Belarus	0.11	0.17	0.31	0.21	0.26	0.19	0.38	0.20	0.31	0.32	0.54	0.54	0.59	0.62	0.55	0.56	0.46	0.54	0.53	0.61	0.51	0.52	0.49	0.62	0.50	0.54	0.31	0.43	0.40	0.47
Belgium	0.46	0.35	0.41	0.37	0.28	0.34	0.42	0.28	0.26	0.36	0.63	0.63	0.67	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.68	0.77	0.59	0.69	0.63	0.63	0.65	0.69	0.71	0.69	0.62	0.76	0.54	0.61
Bosnia Herzegovina	0.41	0.59	0.39	0.63	0.26	0.46	0.42	0.47	0.36	0.53	0.64	0.41	0.70	0.49	0.66	0.59	0.59	0.49	0.55	0.63	0.65	0.41	0.70	0.49	0.68	0.60	0.59	0.50	0.53	0.61
Bulgaria	0.57	0.54	0.49	0.50	0.36	0.51	0.49	0.59	0.53	0.63	0.75	0.66	0.74	0.76	0.59	0.64	0.41	0.47	0.38	0.48	0.75	0.66	0.74	0.75	0.60	0.62	0.38	0.43	0.30	0.41
Croatia	0.45	0.76	0.37	0.57	0.43	0.42	0.52	0.50	0.45	0.46	0.70	0.61	0.75	0.67	0.69	0.66	0.56	0.57	0.53	0.61	0.71	0.60	0.79	0.68	0.70	0.65	0.54	0.53	0.49	0.59
Cyprus	0.35	0.66	0.38	0.40	0.26	0.40	0.40	0.31	0.21	0.20	0.70	0.61	0.80	0.72	0.92	0.82	0.78	0.79	0.72	0.77	0.70	0.61	0.80	0.73	0.91	0.82	0.76	0.78	0.71	0.76
Czech Republic	0.36	0.40	0.49	0.41	0.34	0.36	0.44	0.51	0.44	0.32	0.32	0.19	0.28	0.20	0.23	0.25	0.23	0.21	0.31	0.38	0.30	0.18	0.23	0.17	0.18	0.20	0.16	0.14	0.18	0.33
Denmark	0.45	0.42	0.36	0.28	0.29	0.39	0.45	0.45	0.24	0.16	0.54	0.46	0.58	0.61	0.53	0.61	0.58	0.63	0.58	0.77	0.53	0.44	0.55	0.61	0.57	0.61	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.72
Estonia	0.29	0.23	0.30	0.19	0.29	0.29	0.39	0.22	0.29	0.34	0.78	0.81	0.68	0.77	0.54	0.67	0.43	0.58	0.37	0.59	0.81	0.82	0.69	0.80	0.55	0.64	0.35	0.52	0.26	0.47
Finland	0.34	0.32	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.20	0.30	0.26	0.27	0.22	0.70	0.74	0.72	0.75	0.68	0.77	0.61	0.73	0.51	0.63	0.69	0.75	0.73	0.76	0.67	0.75	0.58	0.69	0.44	0.56
France	0.54	0.51	0.35	0.35	0.29	0.32	0.37	0.26	0.27	0.25	0.61	0.58	0.62	0.59	0.66	0.70	0.66	0.75	0.62	0.72	0.59	0.57	0.61	0.59	0.67	0.67	0.64	0.73	0.58	0.66
Georgia	0.32	0.26	0.50	0.28	0.30	0.40	0.64	0.38	0.45	0.45	0.78	0.71	0.70	0.68	0.62	0.67	0.54	0.61	0.45	0.66	0.76	0.70	0.69	0.70	0.60	0.66	0.40	0.51	0.35	0.57
Germany	0.37	0.44	0.36	0.33	0.53	0.36	0.34	0.38	0.20	0.39	0.46	0.22	0.44	0.31	0.43	0.34	0.39	0.37	0.44	0.46	0.41	0.20	0.39	0.27	0.37	0.28	0.33	0.27	0.37	0.36
Great Britain	0.35	0.29	0.22	0.33	0.25	0.30	0.31	0.23	0.17	0.18	0.59	0.45	0.66	0.56	0.71	0.70	0.65	0.68	0.65	0.69	0.57	0.42	0.66	0.53	0.70	0.68	0.61	0.65	0.56	0.66
Greece	0.68	0.57	0.62	0.54	0.44	0.39	0.46	0.36	0.30	0.34	0.65	0.53	0.72	0.65	0.80	0.80	0.76	0.81	0.66	0.75	0.63	0.51	0.72	0.65	0.82	0.79	0.77	0.81	0.63	0.74
Hungary	0.50	0.43	0.36	0.46	0.40	0.46	0.53	0.63	0.60	0.59	0.64	0.59	0.52	0.51	0.45	0.52	0.36	0.38	0.40	0.47	0.64	0.59	0.52	0.50	0.43	0.50	0.31	0.34	0.33	0.41
Iceland	NA	NA	0.06	NA	0.44	0.27	0.30	0.37	0.28	0.33	NA	NA	0.58	NA	0.51	0.61	0.45	0.68	0.34	0.72	NA	NA	0.60	NA	0.44	0.57	0.45	0.63	0.26	0.60
Ireland	0.40	0.45	0.30	0.36	0.30	0.34	0.35	0.33	0.38	0.38	0.59	0.67	0.76	0.73	0.73	0.78	0.68	0.75	0.71	0.77	0.56	0.66	0.76	0.72	0.73	0.79	0.65	0.73	0.67	0.73
Italy	0.57	0.58	0.54	0.55	0.43	0.49	0.34	0.42	0.31	0.35	0.70	0.62	0.83	0.77	0.72	0.76	0.68	0.73	0.59	0.61	0.71	0.63	0.83	0.79	0.73	0.75	0.69	0.74	0.55	0.59
Kosovo	0.35	0.72	0.32	0.46	0.18	0.48	0.36	0.49	0.28	0.51	0.72	0.30	0.76	0.44	0.64	0.50	0.56	0.43	0.57	0.51	0.73	0.30	0.76	0.44	0.66	0.52	0.56	0.44	0.58	0.51
Latvia	0.30	0.38	0.21	0.05	0.25	0.29	0.19	0.40	0.38	0.42	0.67	0.72	0.66	0.69	0.59	0.67	0.43	0.63	0.46	0.66	0.71	0.73	0.70	0.73	0.57	0.69	0.43	0.59	0.38	0.64
Lithuania	0.22	0.32	0.14	0.18	0.09	0.16	0.22	0.29	0.24	0.34	0.80	0.80	0.68	0.81	0.62	0.70	0.58	0.61	0.53	0.71	0.81	0.80	0.73	0.82	0.63	0.71	0.54	0.50	0.38	0.59
Macedonia	0.74	0.71	0.52	0.62	0.53	0.74	0.46	0.74	0.45	0.63	0.71	0.59	0.64	0.53	0.65	0.44	0.50	0.42	0.60	0.59	0.72	0.60	0.64	0.54	0.65	0.43	0.49	0.40	0.58	0.54
Moldova	0.26	0.38	0.20	0.25	0.22	0.18	0.19	0.24	0.42	0.51	0.82	0.81	0.79	0.85	0.76	0.78	0.54	0.59	0.44	0.62	0.82	0.83	0.79	0.87	0.77	0.78	0.51	0.57	0.38	0.56
Montenegro	0.43	0.50	0.40	0.63	0.38	0.51	0.43	0.43	0.65	0.43	0.67	0.57	0.69	0.47	0.56	0.54	0.42	0.48	0.46	0.60	0.69	0.58	0.70	0.46	0.55	0.55	0.42	0.47	0.40	0.55
Netherlands	0.44	0.49	0.39	0.49	0.26	0.26	0.38	0.29	0.24	0.30	0.74	0.59	0.73	0.63	0.75	0.68	0.67	0.73	0.71	0.72	0.75	0.59	0.74	0.63	0.77	0.70	0.67	0.73	0.77	0.71
Norway	0.27	0.46	0.30	0.36	0.41	0.45	0.41	0.43	0.23	0.31	0.69	0.59	0.67	0.62	0.56	0.68	0.57	0.74	0.58	0.72	0.68	0.58	0.66	0.63	0.51	0.65	0.50	0.65	0.50	0.62
Poland	0.42	0.30	0.42	0.36	0.43	0.37	0.39	0.52	0.37	0.32	0.76	0.79	0.61	0.70	0.48	0.61	0.46	0.59	0.52	0.77	0.75	0.80	0.60	0.71	0.45	0.60	0.42	0.57	0.47	0.73
Portugal	0.56	0.62	0.57	0.68	0.65	0.57	0.71	0.67	0.51	0.44	0.56	0.50	0.65	0.58	0.57	0.63	0.68	0.73	0.69	0.84	0.55	0.49	0.66	0.58	0.56	0.64	0.69	0.72	0.70	0.84
Romania	0.54	0.51	0.49	0.62	0.42	0.52	0.52	0.54	0.56	0.81	0.70	0.57	0.86	0.73	0.67	0.75	0.58	0.69	0.57	0.64	0.70	0.57	0.87	0.74	0.68	0.73	0.56	0.68	0.48	0.58
Russian Federation	0.28	0.26	0.15	0.22	0.14	0.19	0.27	0.26	0.40	0.42	0.68	0.81	0.75	0.83	0.74	0.72	0.62	0.70	0.63	0.80	0.71	0.89	0.80	0.88	0.86	0.76	0.57	0.69	0.38	0.53
Serbia	0.57	0.66	0.35	0.51	0.42	0.39	0.42	0.54	0.41	0.49	0.70	0.53	0.67	0.55	0.64	0.54	0.42	0.43	0.44	0.48	0.71	0.53	0.68	0.56	0.64	0.54	0.41	0.42	0.40	0.47
Slovak Republic	0.28	0.26	0.33	0.38	0.30	0.28	0.44	0.43	0.33	0.45	0.64	0.51	0.52	0.48	0.39	0.44	0.32	0.35	0.38	0.41	0.65	0.51	0.51	0.47	0.36	0.43	0.27	0.30	0.33	0.30
Slovenia	0.37	0.43	0.38	0.42	0.40	0.51	0.50	0.55	0.24	0.46	0.62	0.43	0.49	0.47	0.48	0.55	0.42	0.64	0.47	0.68	0.62	0.42	0.49	0.45	0.47	0.52	0.38	0.60	0.46	0.65
Spain	0.68	0.49	0.56	0.44	0.42	0.42	0.39	0.35	0.39	0.22	0.61	0.51	0.78	0.71	0.82	0.85	0.81	0.82	0.71	0.83	0.60	0.51	0.78	0.71	0.84	0.85	0.82	0.82	0.69	0.83
Sweden	0.34	0.26	0.23	0.22	0.29	0.23	0.33	0.31	0.22	0.30	0.78	0.78	0.75	0.81	0.66	0.75	0.62	0.71	0.60	0.74	0.79	0.80	0.79	0.85	0.68	0.75	0.60	0.69	0.56	0.67
Switzerland	0.37	0.31	0.33	0.39	0.27	0.28	0.35	0.43	0.32	0.43	0.67	0.36	0.64	0.50	0.66	0.52	0.65	0.57	0.53	0.50	0.63	0.35	0.60	0.48	0.63	0.47	0.57	0.48	0.47	0.38
Turkey	NA	NA	0.51	0.64	0.59	0.59	0.50	0.49	0.46	0.66	NA	NA	0.52	0.48	0.63	0.56	0.70	0.54	0.81	0.64	NA	NA	0.52	0.48	0.65	0.54	0.70	0.54	0.80	0.64
Ukraine	0.24	0.23	0.26	0.17	0.22	0.15	0.29	0.38	0.34	0.43	0.90	0.79	0.78	0.82	0.74	0.80	0.58	0.73	0.68	0.77	0.90	0.81	0.78	0.81	0.68	0.76	0.54	0.67	0.51	0.55

Table A.8: Regressions Country-Cohort-Gender Specific Overall Educational Attainment is Controlled

Preference for Redistribution (v198)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
$E = 2 \mid P = 1$	0.191***	0.192***	0.194***	0.197***	0.197***
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.064)
$E = 3 \mid P = 1$	0.482***	0.486***	0.488***	0.492***	0.493***
	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.105)
$E = 1 \mid P = 2$	0.246*	0.243*	0.244*	0.239	0.239
	(0.142)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.143)
$E = 2 \mid P = 2$	0.296***	0.297***	0.295***	0.290***	0.289***
	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.077)
$E = 3 \mid P = 2$	0.531***	0.534***	0.533***	0.530***	0.530***
	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)
$E = 1 \mid P = 3$	0.129	0.122	0.119	0.116	0.116
	(0.263)	(0.268)	(0.266)	(0.268)	(0.269)
$E = 2 \mid P = 3$	0.382***	0.381***	0.380***	0.374***	0.374***
	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.138)
$E = 3 \mid P = 3$	0.631***	0.633***	0.632***	0.630***	0.630***
	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)
log(Income)	0.179***	0.174***	0.173***	0.172***	0.172***
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Cohort Percentage $E = 2$	-0.043	-0.138	-0.081	-0.036	-0.035
	(0.128)	(0.130)	(0.133)	(0.131)	(0.132)
Cohort Percentage $E = 3$	-0.174	-0.215	-0.170	-0.102	-0.085
	(0.138)	(0.153)	(0.155)	(0.158)	(0.157)
Intergenerational Persistence (IGP)			0.309*		
			(0.169)		
Cond. Abs. Upward Mobility (MAcatC1)				-0.542**	
				(0.223)	
Abs. Upward Mobility (MAcatM)					-0.666***
					(0.239)
Constant	4.825***	4.804***	4.629***	5.001***	5.099***
	(0.102)	(0.148)	(0.167)	(0.188)	(0.202)
Observations	32,425	32,425	32,425	32,425	32,425
R^2	0.151	0.152	0.152	0.152	0.152
Demographic Controls	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES


Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by asterisks (*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is *preferences for redistribution* (v198), measured on a 10-point scale where lower values indicate greater support for redistribution. The rows list the independent variables. The coefficient for $E = X|P = Y$ represents the dummy variable for respondents whose own educational attainment is X and whose father's educational attainment is Y, where 1 denotes lower education, 2 denotes middle education, and 3 denotes upper education. log(Income) is the natural logarithm of PPP-adjusted household income in euros. Cohort Percentage $E = X$ refers to the share of subjects with X level of education. IGP, MAcatM, and MAcatC1 are *GDIM*-based measures of intergenerational persistence, absolute upward mobility, and conditional absolute upward mobility, respectively. All variables except the *GDIM*-based measures are from the *EVS* 2008 wave.

Table A.9: Regressions with Various Configurations of Educational Attainment Variables & Extended set of Demographics Variables (Including Current Employment Status & Occupation)

	Preference for Redistribution (v198)											
VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
$E = 1$	-0.151**	-0.136**		-0.150**	-0.135**		-0.149**	-0.136**		-0.149**	-0.136**	
	(0.063)	(0.063)		(0.063)	(0.063)		(0.063)	(0.063)		(0.063)	(0.063)	
$E = 3$	0.024	0.018		0.024	0.019		0.024	0.019		0.024	0.019	
	(0.022)	(0.022)		(0.023)	(0.022)		(0.023)	(0.022)		(0.023)	(0.022)	
$P = 1$		-0.082**			-0.079*			-0.070*			-0.068*	
		(0.039)			(0.039)			(0.038)			(0.038)	
$P = 3$		0.008			0.008			0.008			0.008	
		(0.023)			(0.023)			(0.023)			(0.023)	
$E = 1 \mid P = 1$			-0.198***			-0.198***			-0.194***			-0.194***
			(0.068)			(0.068)			(0.068)			(0.068)
$E = 3 \mid P = 1$			0.008			0.010			0.016			0.016
			(0.069)			(0.070)			(0.069)			(0.069)
$E = 1 \mid P = 3$			-0.059			-0.061			-0.065			-0.065
			(0.257)			(0.256)			(0.257)			(0.257)
$E = 3 \mid P = 3$			0.097			0.096			0.095			0.095
			(0.077)			(0.077)			(0.077)			(0.077)
log(Income)	0.139**	0.136**	0.139**	0.137**	0.134**	0.137**	0.134**	0.132**	0.134**	0.134**	0.131**	0.134**
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.057)
Cohort Percentage $E = 2$	-0.186	-0.174	-0.209	-0.140	-0.132	-0.165	-0.060	-0.056	-0.085	-0.058	-0.053	-0.082
	(0.142)	(0.143)	(0.148)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.151)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.151)	(0.145)	(0.146)	(0.152)
Cohort Percentage $E = 3$	-0.267	-0.258	-0.253	-0.232	-0.226	-0.219	-0.128	-0.127	-0.116	-0.107	-0.105	-0.095
	(0.167)	(0.167)	(0.162)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.165)	(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.168)	(0.171)	(0.171)	(0.168)
Intergenerational Persistence (IGP)				0.267	0.250	0.264						
				(0.166)	(0.164)	(0.166)						
Cond. Abs. Upward Mobility (MAcatC1)							-0.714**	-0.681**	-0.706**			
							(0.276)	(0.269)	(0.275)			
Abs. Upward Mobility (MAcatM)										-0.882***	-0.848***	-0.873***
										(0.298)	(0.291)	(0.297)
Constant	5.565***	5.567***	5.585***	5.411***	5.422***	5.433***	5.809***	5.798***	5.826***	5.944***	5.929***	5.960***
	(0.140)	(0.139)	(0.140)	(0.186)	(0.187)	(0.186)	(0.201)	(0.195)	(0.194)	(0.224)	(0.218)	(0.217)
Observations	28,628	28,628	28,628	28,628	28,628	28,628	28,628	28,628	28,628	28,628	28,628	28,628
R^2	0.159	0.159	0.159	0.159	0.159	0.159	0.159	0.159	0.159	0.159	0.159	0.159
Demographic Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES


Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by asterisks (*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is *preferences for redistribution* (v198), measured on a 10-point scale where lower values indicate greater support for redistribution. The rows list the independent variables. P and E denote the education levels of the parent and subject, respectively. The coefficient for $E = X|P = Y$ represents the dummy variable for respondents whose own educational attainment is X and whose father's educational attainment is Y, where 1 denotes lower education, 2 denotes middle education, and 3 denotes upper education. log(Income) is the natural logarithm of PPP-adjusted household income in euros. Cohort Percentage $E = X$ refers to the share of subjects with X level of education. IGP, MAcatM, and MAcatC1 are *GDIM*-based measures of intergenerational persistence, absolute upward mobility, and conditional absolute upward mobility, respectively. All variables except the *GDIM*-based measures are from the *EVS* 2008 wave.

Figure A.1: Distribution of Redistributive Preference Responses (v198) by Country



Notes: Figure A.1 displays the distribution of responses for redistributive preferences (*EVS*'s v198), i.e., preferences for redistribution measured on a 10-point scale where lower values indicate greater support for redistribution.

Figure A.2: Distribution of Intergenerational Educational Movements by Country



Notes: Figure A.2 shows the distribution of descendants' educational attainment (1: lower, 2: middle, and 3: upper) conditioned on parental education (1: lower, 2: middle, and 3: upper). The nine bars represent the frequencies (in percentages) of parental education and descendant education pairs. For example, the sixth bar denotes the frequency of descendants who graduated from university (upper) and whose parent is a high school graduate (middle).

B Appendix: Proofs of the Model

Proof of Lemma 1. With logarithmic utility $u(c) = \log(c)$ and $v(g) = \log(g)$, the closed-form solution for most-preferred tax rate is:

$$\tilde{\tau}(a_1, y_2) = \frac{1}{2\left[1 - \alpha\left(\frac{\overline{a_1}+\overline{y}}{a_1+y_2}\right)\right]}$$

Assuming interior solution, $\tilde{\tau}\left(a_1^L, y_H\right) < \tilde{\tau}\left(a_1^L, y_L\right)$ and $\tilde{\tau}\left(a_1^H, y_H\right) < \tilde{\tau}\left(a_1^H, y_L\right)$ hold on the above closed-form expression. Using the notation for education histories, this implies $\tilde{\tau}^{LH} < \tilde{\tau}^{LL}$, and $\tilde{\tau}^{HH} < \tilde{\tau}^{HL}$.

Proof of Lemma 2. Given $a_1^H > a_1^L$ as $p < 1$, the closed-form solution clearly shows $\tilde{\tau}\left(a_1^H, y_H\right) < \tilde{\tau}\left(a_1^L, y_H\right)$ and $\tilde{\tau}\left(a_1^H, y_L\right) < \tilde{\tau}\left(a_1^L, y_L\right)$ if an interior solution. Therefore $\tilde{\tau}^{LH} < \tilde{\tau}^{HH}$, and $\tilde{\tau}^{HL} < \tilde{\tau}^{LL}$.

Proof of Lemma 3. For any utility function with $u'(\cdot) > 0$ and $u''(\cdot) < 0$, $a_1^H(e_H) > 0 > a_1^L(e_L)$. In addition, the third derivative of the utility function governs the level of the asset choices (and their summation). If $u'''(\cdot) = 0$ as in the case of a quadratic utility function, $u(c) = c - \frac{b}{2}c^2$, asset choices satisfy:

$$a_1^L(e_L)^{\text{QUAD}} = \frac{(1-p)\left(y_L - y_H\right)}{2} < 0 < a_1^H(e_H)^{\text{QUAD}} = \frac{(1-p)\left(y_H - y_L\right)}{2}$$

Thus, $a_1^L(e_L)^{\text{QUAD}} + a_1^H(e_H)^{\text{QUAD}} = 0$. The reason for this result is clear: when $u'''(\cdot) = 0$, there is no impetus for *precautionary savings*, i.e., savings due only to the presence of uncertainty. As a result, households decide on their asset levels only to smooth their consumption over the two periods when they have quadratic utility. When $u'''(\cdot) > 0$ as in the case of most utility functions, the natural logarithm included, the precautionary impetus kicks in, and the low-educated individual does not borrow as much as in the case with quadratic utility, $a_1^L(e_L)^{\text{QUAD}} < a_1^L(e_L)$. Also, the high-educated individual saves up more than the amount under quadratic utility, $a_1^H(e_H)^{\text{QUAD}} < a_1^H(e_H)$. Therefore, when $u'''(\cdot) > 0$, the total asset level at the beginning of the second period is strictly positive, $\overline{a_1} = \frac{a_1^H(e_H)+a_1^L(e_L)}{2} > 0$.

Higher intergenerational educational persistence p (with $p > 0.5$ so that intergenerational educational correlation $2p - 1 > 0$ as seen in the data) reduces future income uncertainty for both high-educated and low-educated families. As a result, the asset choices of both types converge closer to zero: high-educated individuals save less and low-educated individuals borrow less.

The rationale is that with higher educational persistence, children of highly educated parents are more likely to also receive high education. Therefore, those parents feel less need to leave wealth for their children. Similarly, with higher persistence, children of less educated parents are more likely to also receive little education. Therefore, those parents do not need to borrow as much to limit their children's debt burden, compared to a world with lower intergenerational persistence.

This negative relationship between intergenerational persistence and the absolute value of asset holdings is clearest when utility functions are quadratic: $a_1^L(e_L)^{\text{QUAD}} = \frac{(1-p)(y_L-y_H)}{2}$ & $a_1^H(e_H)^{\text{QUAD}} = \frac{(1-p)(y_H-y_L)}{2}$ where asset holding decisions are free of precautionary savings.

In the case of logarithmic utility, the presence of precautionary impetus complicates asset choice deci-

sions, which respond to an infinitesimal increase in persistence as follows:

$$\frac{\mathrm{d}\, a_1^L(e_L)}{\mathrm{d}\, p} = \frac{y_L}{4} - \frac{y_H}{4} + \frac{\left(y_H - y_L\right)\left(y_H + 5\, y_L + p\, y_H - p\, y_L\right)}{4\sqrt{[p(y_H - y_L)]^2 + (y_H - 3y_L)^2 + p(-10y_L^2 + 8y_H y_L + 2y_H^2)}}$$

$$\frac{\mathrm{d}\, a_1^H(e_H)}{d\ p} = \frac{y_H}{4} - \frac{y_L}{4} - \frac{\left(y_H - y_L\right)\left(5\, y_H + y_L - p\, y_H + p\, y_L\right)}{4\sqrt{[p(y_H - y_L)]^2 + (3y_H - y_L)^2 + p(-10y_H^2 + 8y_H y_L + 2y_L^2)}}$$

One could confirm that i) $\frac{\mathrm{d}\, a_1^L(e_L)}{\mathrm{d}\, p} > 0$ & $\frac{\mathrm{d}\, a_1^H(e_H)}{\mathrm{d}\, p} < 0$, and ii) $|\frac{\mathrm{d}\, a_1^L(e_L)}{\mathrm{d}\, p}| < |\frac{\mathrm{d}\, a_1^H(e_H)}{\mathrm{d}\, p}|$. The drop in the high-educated type's savings is higher than the drop in the low-educated type's borrowing. Accordingly, $|\frac{\mathrm{d}\, \overline{a_1}}{\mathrm{d}\, p}| < 0$, i.e., the level of average asset holdings is lower when persistence is higher.

Then, the closed-form solution for the most-preferred tax rate $\tilde{\tau}\left(a_1, y_2\right) = \frac{1}{2\left[1-\alpha\left(\frac{\overline{a_1}+\bar{y}}{a_1+y_2}\right)\right]}$ requires the most-preferred tax rates of those born to low-educated parents $\tilde{\tau}^{LL}$ & $\tilde{\tau}^{LH}$ to unambiguously decrease over persistence, since $\overline{a_1}$ decreases and $a_1^L(e_L)$ increases over p. In the case of those born to high-educated parents, the drop in $a_1^L(e_L)$ can be larger than the drop in $\overline{a_1}$, and most-preferred tax rates of those born to high-educated parents $\tilde{\tau}^{HL}$ & $\tilde{\tau}^{HH}$ can increase over p.

Finally, higher persistence comes with distributional implications. When persistence is higher, the share of low-educated descendants born to low-educated parents and the share of high-educated descendants born to high-educated parents ($\frac{p}{2}$ and $\frac{p}{2}$) are also higher. In contrast, the shares of descendants whose education differs from that of their parents ($\frac{1-p}{2}$ for both cases) are lower. As a result of these rich interactions, the average most-preferred tax rate, $\overline{\tilde{\tau}} \equiv \frac{p}{2}\,\tilde{\tau}^{LL} + \frac{1-p}{2}\,\tilde{\tau}^{LH} + \frac{p}{2}\,\tilde{\tau}^{HH} + \frac{1-p}{2}\,\tilde{\tau}^{HL}$ can decrease over intergenerational persistence, p.

A Simulation Exercise

To illustrate the important channels in action, we provide a numerical simulation example. We set the model parameter values as follows: $\alpha = 0.2; y_L = 0.5; y_H = 1.5$. We vary only the intergenerational persistence in education, p. The model's predictions under the two different persistence levels are then as follows:

Table B.9: Simulation Results

	a_1^L	$a_1^{L\,\mathrm{QUAD}}$	a_1^H	$a_1^{H\,\mathrm{QUAD}}$	$\overline{a_1}$	$\tilde{\tau}^{LL}$	$\tilde{\tau}^{HL}$	$\tilde{\tau}^{LH}$	$\tilde{\tau}^{HH}$	$\overline{\tilde{\tau}}$
$p = 0.70$	−0.058	−0.150	0.250	0.150	0.096	0.992	0.707	0.590	0.572	0.742
$p = 0.80$	−0.037	−0.100	0.190	0.100	0.077	0.934	0.727	0.586	0.573	0.734

Higher intergenerational persistence in education lowers the average most-preferred tax rate in the model economy, which conforms with our empirical findings.