Interest in Politics and Intergenerational Linkages*

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Abstract

In this paper, I investigate the determinants of individual interest in politics in Europe. I first show that variables associated with socioeconomic status are strong predictors of interest in politics. Next, I show that *parental educational background* also matters decisively: individuals born to better-educated parents are significantly more likely to find interest in politics. I also show that parental influence in shaping descendants's interest in politics is not confined to parental educational background: individuals who frequently talk politics with their parents are more likely to develop a taste in following politics. In addition, I display that dramatic past events have long-lasting implications in shaping interest in politics: those who experience the divorce of their parents robustly display more interest in politics, whereas there is also evidence that those who experience the death of their parents or their own children are more likely to be find interest in politics.

Keywords: intergenerational educational mobility; political participation; parental influence

JEL Classification: D72, J62

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1 Introduction

Political economy and science literatures on electoral behavior documents well that individuals with low-socioeconomic-status (SES) are considerably less likely to take part in political processes, follow, or even find interest in politics.[1] However, this literature focuses predominantly on the role of *self*, and ignores the role of *intergenerational* linkages. As a rare exception, Hatemi et al. (2009) use data on twins to draw attention on the pivotal role of "family environment" in shaping political preferences during the upbringing of descendants, and Bougher (2017) documents a direct association between mother's democratic parenting practices experienced from ages 10 to 14 and political interest in adulthood, as well as an indirect association with turnout and political trust for the case of the United States.[2] Neither of the studies have a cross-sectional perspective, and whether intergenerational influences hold true cross-borders globally has yet remained unveiled so far.

In this paper, I study this issue by studying the determinants of *interest in politics*. Using a large survey data covering 46 countries, I first verify that indeed variables associated with low socioeconomic status, such as low household income, low educational attainment, and unemployment are negative predictors of interest in politics. Next, I document that *parental educational background* matters decisively: individuals with better-educated parents are significantly more likely to display interest in politics.[3] I further show that parental influence in shaping political interest is not confined to parental educational background: individuals who frequently talk politics with their parents are significantly more likely to display interest in politics. Further, I report that dramatic events in the past have long-lasting implications: those who experience the divorce of their parents are robustly more likely to display interest in politics, whereas there is some evidence that those who experience the death of their parents, or their own children are more likely to be interested in politics. Using several tests, I confirm that these results pass various robustness tests: I use both logistic and ordered logistic maximum likelihood regressions, and I employ individuals's subjective evaluation of "importance of politics in life" and frequency of "following politics in media" as alternative independent variables, and I show that both measures deliver qualitatively same results, providing further

[1] Taking part in political processes can take different forms, including but not limited to voting, signing petition, attending peaceful political demonstrations or running for candidacy. For a detailed discussion on the advances of this literature, see Oliver (2001), Ansolabehere et al. (2003), Solt (2008), Solt (2010), Gilens and Page (2014), Gilens (2015), among others.

[2] Specifically, Hatemi et al. (2009) document that the time window: from age 9 to 17 throughout which attitudes crystallize is critical, and family environment is particularly decisive throuhgout this period.

[3] It is possible to consider education as a proxy for socio-economic status, and interpret intergenerational educational mobility to account for mobility across different socio-economic classes.

credibility in these cross-border findings.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, I describe the data and methodology; in section 3, I present and discuss my findings; and in section 4 I conclude.

2 Data and Methodology

2.1 Data Description

In my empirical investigation, I use individual-level data collected by by European Values Study (EVS) in 2008. While the EVS carries out several surveys about individual characteristics over time, the only wave that allows the study of *intergenerational educational mobility* (via containing information on both subjects's and their parents's educational backgrounds) is the 2008 survey, which I use as my working sample. The 2008 wave covers 46 European countries for over 40,000 respondents, [4] and the participants of the EVS respond on a wide array of issues, from demographics to moral principles, political preferences, work and family values, among other issues.

As briefly discussed, in this paper I concentrate on *interest in politics* of subjects. For this goal, I utilize the variable with the code `v186` whose wording and ordinal Likert response options are as follows:

`v186: How interested would you say you are in politics?`

- ❍ `4: very interested`
- ❍ `3: somewhat interested`
- ❍ `2: not very interested`
- ❍ `1: not at all interested`

Another key variable is participants's *intergenerational education mobility*. In order to measure mobility, following Torul and Öztunalı (2017) I first focus only on those who are 25 years or older (thereby completed educational training by OECD definition) and I group educational attainment of both descendants and their parents into three ordinal categories: i) **low**-education (individuals with less than or equal to secondary education: ISCED 0,1 and 2), ii) **medium**-education (individuals with upper secondary education and post-secondary education: ISCED 3 and 4), and iii) **high**-education (individuals with tertiary education

[4] Sample sizes vary over question types, however none of my regressions have fewer than 21,500 observations.

and above: ISCED 5 and 6); and second I take the 3-category education level of the *better-educated* parent for a one-to-one mapping from parents to descendants.[5] I display a sample intergenerational educational mobility transition matrix in Table 1.

Table 1: Intergenerational Educational Mobility Matrix

Parent \ Descendant	**Low** (1)	**Medium** (2)	**High** (3)
Low (1)	Edu=1 P Edu=1	Edu=2 P Edu=1	Edu=3 P Edu=1
Medium(2)	Edu=1 P Edu=2	Edu=2 P Edu=2	Edu=3 P Edu=2
High (3)	Edu=1 P Edu=3	Edu=2 P Edu=3	Edu=3 P Edu=3

For a reliable empirical investigation, these key variables of interest need to display sufficient variation. In order to verify indeed this is the case, in Figure 1, I plot frequencies of interest in politics on the left and intergenerational educational mobility on the right panel.[6] The left panel displays that participant responses to each four options are sizeable, thereby ensuring the necessary variation condition for the independent variable. The left panel reveals that European parents are predominantly low-educated (about half of the population) and it is particularly uncommon to observe a low-educated descendant born to high-educated parents.[7] Other parent-descendant education clusters display sufficient mass, implying the presence of enough variation on educational mobility.

2.2 Methodology

In my econometric analyses, given the nature of the variables at hand, I rely either on i) logistic maximum likelihood (`logit`) or ii) ordered logistic maximum likelihood (`ordered logit`) regressions. In order to prepare data for the `logit` and `ordered logit (ologit)` regressions, I proceed as follows:


- `logit`: for interest in politicas, I define a new political interest variable, which takes a value of 1 if subjects respond to question `v186` either as "very interested" or as "somewhat

[5] For a discussion on the reasons behind the three-level categorization and intergenerational educational mobility in general, see Torul and Öztunalı (2017).

[6] For histograms of political interest and intergenerational educational mobility by country, see Figure A.1 and A.2.

[7] The rarity of low-educated descendants born to high-educated parents could signal that coefficients associated this category should be taken with a grain of salt in econometric regressions.

Figure 1: Distribution of Political Interest and Intergenerational Educational Mobility



† The left panel displays the histogram of responses to the question `v186`: "How interested would you say you are in politics?" The four answers are ranked responses in ascending order (`4: very interested, ..., 1 not interested at all`). The right panel displays the histogram of educational attainment (1: low; 2: medium, 3: high) conditional on parental education, e.g. the sixth bar denotes the frequency of descendants who graduated from university (i.e. 3: high) and whose *better-educated* parent is a high-school graduate. (i.e. 2: medium)

interested" in politics; and 0 if subjects respond either as "not very interested" or as "not interested at all" in politics. The re-clustering is formally as follows:

$$\text{Political Interest} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } \texttt{v186} = 3 \text{ or } \texttt{v186} = 4 \\ 0, & \text{if } \texttt{v186} = 1 \text{ or } \texttt{v186} = 2 \end{cases}$$

Next, I use the newly-constructed political interest measures as the dependent variable in my logistic maximum likelihood regressions.

- `ologit`: First, I re-code *all* ordinal response variables, `v186` included for the sake of normalization into the [0-1] interval: i.e. for political interest I define a new variable as Political interest $= \frac{\texttt{v186}-4}{3}$ so that the four possible values are 0, 1/3, 2/3 and 1. I use the ordinal political interest variable with the four possible values within the [0-1] interval as the dependent variable in my ordered logistic regressions, and I use relevant normalized ordinal variables as independent variables in both the `logit` and the `ologit` regressions.

For the `logit` regression, given the binary nature of the political interest variable, I estimate the following regression equation

$$\mathbb{E}(PI|X) = \Pr(PI = 1|X) = F\big(\beta_d X_d + \beta_p X_p + \sum_{j=1}^{46} \theta_j X_j^c\big) \tag{1}$$

where the left-hand side of (1) refers to the probability of displaying interest in politics and F is the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution, or simply the `logit` link.

X refers to the set of independent variables: X_d refers to the dependent variable vector on demographic control variables, such as sex, age, marital status, income and education level; X_p refers to the vector of parental control variables, such as parental education, parental finances of descendants when they were 14 years old, and the divorce or death of parents; and X^c refers to the vector of country-specific dummy variables to capture the country-fixed effects for the 46 unique countries of interest. [8]

For the `ologit` regression, given the ordinal nature of the political interest variable, I estimate the following regression equation

$$\mathbb{E}(PI|X) = \Pr(\Gamma_z > PI > \Gamma_{z-1}|X) = F\big(\beta_d X_d + \beta_p X_p + \sum_{j=1}^{46} \theta_j X_j^c\big) \tag{2}$$

where Γ_z denotes constant threshold values for the ordered values $z \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$.

3 Results

I summarize the benchmark results of `logit` regressions in Table 2.[9] Results by Model 1 show that likelihood of displaying interest in politics increases over age and decreases over the square of age, thereby suggesting a concave pattern over the life-cycle. The coefficient before the gender dummy reveals that *ceteris paribus*, males are 16.6% more likely to display interest in politics than females. The natural logarithm of PPP-adjusted income (in Euros) also correlates positively with interest in politics. Similarly, employed individuals are 10.5% more likely to be interested in politics than their unemployed counterparts. Further, religiosity, measured by the frequency of attending religious activities, also correlates positively with interest in politics.[10] In Model 2, I add education of participants as an additional control, and show that compared to a below-secondary school graduate, a high-school graduate is 11.9%

[8] Note that while the probability of interest in politics increases over β_d, β_p and θ_j, due to nature of the logit model, coefficients do not directly measure how much the probability would increase in response to a one-unit increase in the independent variable. Hence, for the `logit` models, I report the *marginal effects* when all other correlates are at their mean values:$(\frac{\partial Pr(PI=1)}{\partial X_i}\Big| X_{-i} = \overline{X}_{-i})$ which can be interpreted as the change in the probability of interest in politics when the independent variable increases by one unit, *ceteris paribus*. For `ologit` models, I report actual regression coefficients for brevity (as constant cut thresholds complicate the reporting of marginal effects).

[9] Throughout my estimations, I cluster standard errors at country level. For robustness purposes, I also cluster standard errors at NUTS-2 region-level, which gives qualitatively similar findings. For results of ordinal political interest variable via `ologit`, see Table A.1.

[10] I detect no significant effect of marital status, or living arrangements.

and a college graduate is 25.1% more likely to find interest in politics.[11] These results verify that low socioeconomic status (e.g. low educational attainment, low income) coincides with limited interest in politics, as argued previously in the literature.

In Model 3, I include education level of the better-educated parent as an additional control, show that *ceteris paribus*, individuals with better-educated parents are more likely to display interest in politics: compared to those born to parents with low education, individuals born to high school graduate parents are 2.3% more likely to find interest in politics, and this likelihood increases by an another 3.6% if at least one of the parents holds a university degree. In Model 4, I examine the specific effects of all possible intergenerational educational mobility movements in detail. Model 4 verifies that indeed a university graduate is more likely to find interest in politics if his/her parents are also university graduates. Similarly, a high school graduate born to at least one university graduate parent is as much as 9% more likely to show interest in politics than a high-school graduate whose parents hold no high school or above degrees.

In Model 5 and 6, I explore further causal determinants of interest in politics. In doing so, because frequency of discussing politics with mothers and fathers correlate very highly with parental education, thereby contributing to multicollinearity issues, I rely on a 2 stage least squares (2SLS) estimation strategy: I first regress the frequency of discussing politics with mother on parental education and country-dummies, and calculate the fitted frequency predicted by parental education. Next, I subtract the fitted frequency values from actual frequency values and use the *residual* frequency variable as a control variable in my regressions. I do the same for the frequency of discussing politics with father. The residual terms can be interpreted as capturing any additional effect coming from the frequency of discussing politics with parents beyond parental education. Unpleasant events in the past could have long-lasting implications, interest in politics included. Accordingly, in Model 5 and 6 I also add dummy variables on if participant experiences i) the death of his/her child ii) death of his/her mother, iii) death of his/her father, iv) divorce of his/her parents and v) degree of financial difficulties when he/she was 14 years old. Of these controls, I document that discussing politics with both parents matter substantially in shaping one's interest in politics. I also find that tragedic events in the past increase the likelihood of finding interest in politics: experiencing death of his/her own children and witnessing the divorce of parents significantly increase the likelihood

[11] I add education and educational mobility variables in the form of dummy variables, and hence I do not impose an *ad-hoc* cardinality.

of displaying interest in politics.[12] In addition, unpleasant yet not catastrophic events in the past, such as financial difficulties of parents during the upbringing of descendants (i.e. if parents had problems making ends meet, or had problems replacing broken things when descendants were were 14 years old) have no significant implications on shaping interest in politics.

In order to test for the robustness of these findings, I utilize two other questions addressing similar or relevant issues: i) I use how frequently participants follow politics in media `v281` and ii) how important participants find politics in life `v5`.[13] Table A.2 and A.3 reveal that almost all my findings are strongly robust to alternative wordings of similar or relevant other issues.[14]

4 Conclusions

In this paper, I investigate the determinants of political inclinations. I first show socioeconomic status is a strong predictor of interest in politics. Next, I show that *parental educational background* matters pivotally: individuals with better-educated parents are significantly more likely to show interest in politics. I further show that parental influence in shaping political interest is not confined to parental educational background: individuals who frequently talk politics with their parents are more likely to display find interest in politics. In addition, I display that dramatic past events have lasting implications: those who experience the divorce of their parents are significantly more likely to show interest in politics, whereas there is some evidence that those who experience the death of their parents are also more likely to find interest in politics. Using several tests, I confirm that these results pass robustness checks on several fronts. I believe all these findings signal the need for further research on intergenerational linkages for a better understanding of political tendencies.

[12] While the `logit` models do not detect significant implications of experiencing death of parents, the `ologit` models in Table A.1, which do not suffer losing information due to re-clustering as in the benchmark logit models offer significant regarding death of both parents.

[13] For the first question `v281`, the wording of the question is: `How often do you follow politics in the news on television or on the radio or in the daily papers?` and five possible Likert options are `1 every day, 2 several times a week, 3 once or twice a week, 4 less often, 5 never`. For the second question `v5`, wording is: `Please say, for ... [politics], how important [it] is in your life.` and the four Likert options are `1 very important, 2 quite important, 3 not important, 4 not at all important`. For both variables, I do the re-coding for the `ologit` regressions, and normalize the Likert options within the [0-1] band: i.e. for the first one, I define Politics Following$=\frac{5-\texttt{v281}}{4}$ and for the second one, I define Importance of Politics in Life$=\frac{4-\texttt{v5}}{3}$. Note that in both questions, I preserve the direction that increase in the two new independent variables coincides with interest in politics.

[14] For additional correlates of interest in politics, see Table A.4.

Table 2: Benchmark `Logit` Model

Dependent Variable: Political Interest Dummy

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Age	0.011***	0.012***	0.013***	0.013***	0.014***	0.014***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age^2	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male	0.167***	0.169***	0.170***	0.170***	0.164***	0.164***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
log(Income)	0.066***	0.034***	0.033***	0.032***	0.033***	0.032***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Employed	0.105***	0.091***	0.091***	0.091***	0.079***	0.079***
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Religious	0.062***	0.070***	0.071***	0.072***	0.058***	0.059***
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
P Edu=1&Edu=2				0.115***		0.098***
				(0.010)		(0.011)
P Edu=1&Edu=3				0.265***		0.229***
				(0.018)		(0.019)
P Edu=2&Edu=1				0.088***		0.090***
				(0.022)		(0.023)
P Edu=2&Edu=2				0.141***		0.140***
				(0.015)		(0.015)
P Edu=2&Edu=3				0.251***		0.230***
				(0.017)		(0.017)
P Edu=3&Edu=1				0.067**		0.077*
				(0.033)		(0.046)
P Edu=3&Edu=2				0.206***		0.212***
				(0.023)		(0.025)
P Edu=3&Edu=3				0.285***		0.274***
				(0.018)		(0.019)
Edu=2		0.119***	0.114***		0.099***	
		(0.011)	(0.011)		(0.011)	
Edu=3		0.251***	0.236***		0.202***	
		(0.016)	(0.015)		(0.015)	
P Edu=2			0.023***		0.037***	
			(0.008)		(0.009)	
P Edu=3			0.059***		0.083***	
			(0.012)		(0.015)	
Politics with Mother (2SLS)					0.199***	0.199***
					(0.020)	(0.021)
Politics with Father (2SLS)					0.249***	0.249***
					(0.019)	(0.019)
Death of Children					0.034**	0.034**
					(0.015)	(0.015)
Death of Father					0.012	0.011
					(0.008)	(0.007)
Death of Mother					0.014	0.014
					(0.009)	(0.009)
Divorce of Parents					0.054***	0.054***
					(0.016)	(0.016)
Poor Parents when 14					-0.015	-0.014
					(0.013)	(0.013)
Observations	39,287	39,287	39,287	39,287	32,512	32,512
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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
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Appendix

A Appendix Figures and Tables


Figures

Figure A.1: Histogram of Political Interest by Country



† The figure displays the histogram of responses to the question `v186`: `How interested would you say you are in politics?`, and the four ordinal Likert options are `4: very interested, 3: somewhat interested, 2: not very interested, 1: not interested at all`.

Figure A.2: Histogram of Intergenerational Educational Mobility by Country



† The figure displays the histogram of descendant's educational attainment (1: low; 2: medium, 3: high) conditional on parental education (1: low; 2: medium, 3: high), The nine bars are respective frequencies of Parental Education and Descendant Education pairs {1,1},{1,2},{1,3},{2,1},{2,2},{2,3},{3,1},{3,2},{3,3}, e.g. the sixth bar denotes the frequency of descendants who graduated from university (i.e. 3: high) and whose *better-educated* parent is a high-school graduate. (i.e. 2: medium).

Tables

Table A.1: Ordered Logit (`Ologit`) Model

Dependent Variable: Ordinal Political Interest

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Age	0.045***	0.049***	0.052***	0.052***	0.053***	0.053***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Age^2	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male	0.671***	0.680***	0.681***	0.681***	0.659***	0.660***
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
log(Income)	0.285***	0.153***	0.146***	0.145***	0.141***	0.140***
	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Employed	0.411***	0.348***	0.352***	0.351***	0.290***	0.288***
	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Religious	0.256***	0.285***	0.289***	0.293***	0.225***	0.229***
	(0.059)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.055)
P Edu=1&Edu=2				0.522***		0.443***
				(0.047)		(0.044)
P Edu=1&Edu=3				1.134***		0.964***
				(0.072)		(0.072)
P Edu=2&Edu=1				0.349***		0.361***
				(0.096)		(0.100)
P Edu=2&Edu=2				0.603***		0.586***
				(0.066)		(0.062)
P Edu=2&Edu=3				1.071***		0.966***
				(0.077)		(0.072)
P Edu=3&Edu=1				0.313**		0.345*
				(0.142)		(0.182)
P Edu=3&Edu=2				0.910***		0.906***
				(0.094)		(0.096)
P Edu=3&Edu=3				1.227***		1.161***
				(0.081)		(0.076)
Edu=2		0.528***	0.511***		0.439***	
		(0.049)	(0.047)		(0.044)	
Edu=3		1.076***	1.015***		0.857***	
		(0.066)	(0.062)		(0.059)	
P Edu=2			0.071**		0.127***	
			(0.032)		(0.035)	
P Edu=3			0.243***		0.327***	
			(0.048)		(0.054)	
Politics with Mother (2SLS)					0.738***	0.741***
					(0.074)	(0.074)
Politics with Father (2SLS)					1.024***	1.020***
					(0.078)	(0.078)
Death of Children					0.130**	0.129**
					(0.058)	(0.058)
Death of Father					0.056*	0.055*
					(0.032)	(0.032)
Death of Mother					0.049*	0.050*
					(0.028)	(0.028)
Divorce of Parents					0.235***	0.234***
					(0.050)	(0.050)
Poor Parents when 14					-0.039	-0.038
					(0.044)	(0.044)
Constant cut1	2.614***	2.432***	2.497***	2.515***	2.348***	2.360***
	(0.220)	(0.206)	(0.206)	(0.209)	(0.227)	(0.230)
Constant cut2	4.250***	4.105***	4.171***	4.190***	4.085***	4.098***
	(0.215)	(0.204)	(0.206)	(0.209)	(0.231)	(0.234)
Constant cut3	6.400***	6.303***	6.372***	6.391***	6.403***	6.417***
	(0.222)	(0.212)	(0.214)	(0.217)	(0.238)	(0.241)
Observations	39,287	39,287	39,287	39,287	32,512	32,512
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.2: Ordered Logit (`ologit`) Model on Following Politics in Media

Dependent Variable: Ordinal Politics Following

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Age	0.055***	0.059***	0.060***	0.060***	0.057***	0.057***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Age^2	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male	0.529***	0.530***	0.531***	0.530***	0.519***	0.519***
	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
log(Income)	0.233***	0.141***	0.138***	0.138***	0.131***	0.131***
	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Employed	0.221***	0.174***	0.175***	0.174***	0.120**	0.117**
	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.060)	(0.059)
Religious	0.240***	0.260***	0.263***	0.265***	0.195***	0.198***
	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.062)
P Edu=1&Edu=2				0.329***		0.251***
				(0.040)		(0.037)
P Edu=1&Edu=3				0.784***		0.676***
				(0.060)		(0.062)
P Edu=2&Edu=1				0.188**		0.231**
				(0.088)		(0.106)
P Edu=2&Edu=2				0.398***		0.394***
				(0.057)		(0.063)
P Edu=2&Edu=3				0.732***		0.636***
				(0.071)		(0.071)
P Edu=3&Edu=1				-0.066		-0.223
				(0.143)		(0.174)
P Edu=3&Edu=2				0.515***		0.510***
				(0.075)		(0.077)
P Edu=3&Edu=3				0.796***		0.741***
				(0.075)		(0.073)
Edu=2		0.345***	0.334***		0.270***	
		(0.041)	(0.040)		(0.039)	
Edu=3		0.741***	0.711***		0.590***	
		(0.055)	(0.052)		(0.050)	
P Edu=2			0.050		0.101**	
			(0.034)		(0.043)	
P Edu=3			0.099**		0.156***	
			(0.043)		(0.051)	
Politics with Mother (2SLS)					0.477***	0.480***
					(0.091)	(0.091)
Politics with Father (2SLS)					0.717***	0.715***
					(0.058)	(0.058)
Death of Children					0.221***	0.220***
					(0.058)	(0.058)
Death of Father					0.105***	0.105***
					(0.036)	(0.036)
Death of Mother					0.089***	0.090***
					(0.031)	(0.031)
Divorce of Parents					0.074	0.075
					(0.051)	(0.052)
Poor Parents when 14					-0.031	-0.030
					(0.063)	(0.063)
Constant cut1	0.823***	0.694**	0.730***	0.736***	0.448*	0.451*
	(0.283)	(0.274)	(0.276)	(0.278)	(0.271)	(0.273)
Constant cut2	2.430***	2.312***	2.349***	2.355***	2.083***	2.087***
	(0.273)	(0.266)	(0.269)	(0.272)	(0.262)	(0.265)
Constant cut3	3.155***	3.045***	3.082***	3.088***	2.817***	2.821***
	(0.266)	(0.259)	(0.262)	(0.265)	(0.255)	(0.257)
Constant cut4	4.175***	4.075***	4.112***	4.118***	3.881***	3.885***
	(0.270)	(0.264)	(0.267)	(0.269)	(0.254)	(0.256)
Observations	39,384	39,384	39,384	39,384	32,605	32,605
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.3: `Ordered Logit (ologit)` Model on Importance of Politics in Life

Dependent Variable: Ordinal Importance of Politics in Life

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Age	0.022***	0.024***	0.026***	0.026***	0.031***	0.031***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age^2	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male	0.331***	0.331***	0.332***	0.332***	0.308***	0.309***
	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.035)
log(Income)	0.172***	0.073**	0.068**	0.068**	0.071**	0.070**
	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Employed	0.309***	0.263***	0.265***	0.264***	0.210***	0.209***
	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Religious	0.214***	0.233***	0.236***	0.238***	0.188***	0.190***
	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.056)
P Edu=1&Edu=2				0.363***		0.277***
				(0.048)		(0.047)
P Edu=1&Edu=3				0.796***		0.626***
				(0.063)		(0.063)
P Edu=2&Edu=1				0.176**		0.196**
				(0.080)		(0.087)
P Edu=2&Edu=2				0.417***		0.381***
				(0.054)		(0.058)
P Edu=2&Edu=3				0.801***		0.685***
				(0.077)		(0.079)
P Edu=3&Edu=1				0.215**		0.225*
				(0.108)		(0.125)
P Edu=3&Edu=2				0.621***		0.554***
				(0.095)		(0.096)
P Edu=3&Edu=3				0.846***		0.769***
				(0.070)		(0.069)
Edu=2		0.371***	0.359***		0.275***	
		(0.046)	(0.045)		(0.046)	
Edu=3		0.778***	0.738***		0.583***	
		(0.061)	(0.058)		(0.060)	
P Edu=2			0.056*		0.102***	
			(0.032)		(0.034)	
P Edu=3			0.143***		0.203***	
			(0.050)		(0.052)	
Politics with Mother (2SLS)					0.635***	0.637***
					(0.056)	(0.057)
Politics with Father (2SLS)					0.779***	0.777***
					(0.061)	(0.061)
Death of Children					0.087	0.087
					(0.056)	(0.056)
Death of Father					-0.009	-0.009
					(0.030)	(0.030)
Death of Mother					0.028	0.028
					(0.031)	(0.031)
Divorce of Parents					0.130**	0.129**
					(0.051)	(0.051)
Poor Parents when 14					-0.012	-0.011
					(0.039)	(0.039)
Constant cut1	1.485***	1.305***	1.350***	1.357***	1.341***	1.345***
	(0.250)	(0.240)	(0.238)	(0.238)	(0.235)	(0.236)
Constant cut2	3.341***	3.185***	3.231***	3.239***	3.270***	3.274***
	(0.260)	(0.249)	(0.248)	(0.249)	(0.248)	(0.249)
Constant cut3	5.287***	5.153***	5.199***	5.208***	5.318***	5.323***
	(0.284)	(0.273)	(0.273)	(0.273)	(0.272)	(0.273)
Observations	39,201	39,201	39,201	39,201	32,457	32,457
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.4: `Ordered Logit (ologit)` Model on Interest Politics and Other Correlates

Other Correlates of Ordinal Political Interest

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 2
Political View	0.064	0.013	-0.006	0.044	-0.003	-0.018
	(0.104)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.101)	(0.091)	(0.093)
EU Too Large	-0.152**	-0.100*	-0.035	-0.220***	-0.166***	-0.103
	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Immigrants Threat to Welfare System	-0.209***	-0.207***	-0.186***	-0.224***	-0.209***	-0.175***
	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Immigrants Threat to Society	-0.422***	-0.369***	-0.322***	-0.469***	-0.435***	-0.376***
	(0.088)	(0.092)	(0.086)	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.090)
Satisfied with Democracy		0.186***	0.079*		0.187***	0.075*
		(0.039)	(0.042)		(0.039)	(0.043)
Control over Lofe		0.260***	0.259***		0.228***	0.221***
		(0.070)	(0.074)		(0.069)	(0.070)
People in Need due to Unfair Society		0.113***	0.122***		0.117***	0.130***
		(0.027)	(0.027)		(0.029)	(0.029)
Must Change Society		0.407***	0.443***		0.435***	0.461***
		(0.083)	(0.080)		(0.085)	(0.082)
People Trustable			0.200***			0.251***
			(0.037)			(0.035)
Confidence in Parliament			0.125***			0.134***
			(0.035)			(0.034)
Confidence in Government			0.131***			0.120***
			(0.024)			(0.025)
Constant cut1	1.557***	2.262***	2.565***	1.473***	2.114***	2.415***
	(0.267)	(0.302)	(0.330)	(0.265)	(0.285)	(0.310)
Constant cut2	3.358***	4.084***	4.402***	3.206***	3.868***	4.182***
	(0.263)	(0.298)	(0.325)	(0.255)	(0.273)	(0.297)
Constant cut3	5.713***	6.455***	6.784***	5.416***	6.097***	6.424***
	(0.265)	(0.296)	(0.325)	(0.260)	(0.273)	(0.297)
Observations	23,678	22,450	21,552	28,179	26,653	25,577
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parental Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1